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APPROACHES TO NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PROJECTION FORCES AND REGIONAL DEFENSE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

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APPROACHES TO NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

TUESDAY, MAY 8, 1990

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Projection Forces
and Regional Defense,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:28 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Kennedy, Nunn, Dixon, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, Wallop, Gorton, and Lott.

Committee staff member present: Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk.

Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, Creighton Greene, David S. Lyles, Michael J. McCord, and William H. Smith.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel, Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, George W. Lauffer, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., Mark B. Robinson, and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Barbara L. Braucht, Elizabeth Ann Harlow, Lori M. Jackson, Mary J. Kampo, and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon, William J. Lynn and Nancy E. Soderberg, assistants to Senator Kennedy, Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn, Leon S. Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore, Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby, James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen, Patrick F. McCartan, assistant to Senator Wilson, Anthony H. Cordesman assistant to Senator McCain, Lee W. Whittaker and Thomas G. Moore, assistants to Senator Wallop, Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton, Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott, and Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, CHAIRMAN

Senator Kennedy. We will come to order.

The dramatic changes taking place in the world are creating historic opportunities for progress in all aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations, including arms control. In 2 days of hearings this week, the subcommittee will consider an important area of arms control that should be on the agenda but has not made it there so far: the possibility of negotiating limits on naval forces, particularly nuclear weapons at sea.

This morning, we will hear the views of the distinguished visitor from the Soviet Union. On Friday, the subcommittee will hear from three administration witnesses—Admiral Trost, Chief of Naval Operations, Ambassador Ron Lehman, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Mr. Stephen Hadley, assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

Obviously, the situation in Lithuania and Latvia is clouding the prospects for progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. It is critical to all other hopes that those tensions be reduced, that violence be avoided, and that the differences be resolved by peaceful means.

The U.S.-Soviet Summit scheduled for later this month in Washington holds the promise of significant advances in numerous areas of importance to both our nations. Sensitive discussions are now taking place to resolve the remaining differences on arms control, trade and other issues, so that the summit will be successful. It is not our intention here to intrude on those discussions. Instead, we hope to take a longer view of U.S.-Soviet relations, and in particular to explore an area not currently the subject of negotiation—naval arms control.

For the past half century the world held its breath while the arms race escalated and the United States and the Soviet Union circled each other in the shadow of nuclear war between our nations and potential annihilation for our planet. Now, in the last decade of the century, we have a unique opportunity to achieve the sort of arms control agreements that can end the nuclear arms race, reduce the threat of nuclear war and perhaps eliminate it once and for all time.

Three significant agreements have been the subject of negotiations for many months—to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, to limit conventional forces in Europe, and to cut back chemical weapons. All of us hope that agreements in these areas can be reached in time for announcement at the summit, but we cannot afford to ignore the window of opportunity that exists for other breakthroughs.

I commend the Bush administration for its recent proposals to halt modernization of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and to seek negotiations for their reduction. Another important area for similar progress is the possibility of limits on naval forces. Some in this country argue that a naval arms control agreement would undermine America's historical and continuing interest in freedom of the seas.

That argument proves too much. In recent years the United States has engaged in a variety of arms control initiatives—the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, the 1986 Stockholm Agreement; the 1989 agreement on dangerous military activities established sensible procedures to reduce the risk of unintentional conflict under, on or above the seas. The success of these agreements demonstrate that naval arms control measures are in America's interest, too.

At the same time, the United States has vital interests as a maritime nation that do not threaten the Soviet Union and that we should not negotiate away. We intend, for example, to protect the longstanding ability of our Navy to control the seas for the purposes of free trade in peacetime and for the resupply of our allies in times of conflict. Past Soviet proposals to prohibit U.S. naval activity in certain regions are one-sided negotiating positions that would benefit the Soviet Union by disproportionately harming vital U.S. interests.

As in other areas where we have reached agreements in the past, it is not necessary to have winners and losers to make progress in arms control. We should focus on proposals that benefit both nations. Three areas of naval arms control meet this test: reducing and eventually eliminating naval tactical nuclear weapons; establishing an equal ceiling on nuclear attack submarines; using these agreements as the foundation for further confidence-building measures with respect to our naval forces.

One of the significant benefits of recent improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations is the increase in intergovernmental contacts which now extend to all levels and branches of government. High U.S. officials, such as Secretary of State Baker, have appeared before the Supreme Soviet. We are privileged to continue these worthwhile exchanges today with the appearance of Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev of the Soviet Union.

Marshal Akhromeyev is currently a member of the Supreme Soviet and the chief arms control advisor to President Gorbachev. In World War II, as a young man in his 20s, he took part in two of the most heroic defenses against aggression in modern history—the defense of Leningrad and the battle of Stalingrad.

Most recently, from 1984 to 1988, he served as Chief of General Staff, comparable to the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States. Marshal Akhromeyev has been a major figure in arms control negotiations under President Gorbachev, and he was a key participant in the historic negotiations that led to the successful conclusion of the INF agreement of 1987.

He is also a veteran witness on Capitol Hill. In July 1989 he appeared before the House Armed Services Committee and testified on a broad range of U.S. and Soviet security issues.

Marshal, we welcome you to our Senate subcommittee and will look forward to hearing from you.

Next, I will recognize Senator Cohen and then the chairman of our committee, Senator Nunn and Senator Warner for any comments they want to make.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me commend you for calling this hearing and that on Friday, which I hope is going to clarify the issues that are important to any discussion of naval forces and the question of negotiated limits on those forces.

It is also a distinct pleasure for me to have Marshal Akhromeyev testify before the subcommittee and given his influential role within the Soviet Government, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, I think all of us look forward to the opportunity to hear his views not only on naval forces and arms control but a number of issues of importance to our two countries.

We are living in the midst of vast changes—vast political changes throughout the world—but in the midst of all of this change there are two things, according to Bismarck, that remain unchangeable. That is, history and geography, and the one enduring fact about geography is that we are, in fact, an island Nation, and we depend upon having open and unimpeded access to the sea lines of communication throughout the world.

Any reduction in that ability to maintain that access would be tantamount to losing oxygen to our lungs. It would mean the demise of this country as a free and prosperous Nation, and so by necessity we are, and we have to be and hopefully will be, a maritime power for years to come.

By contrast, the Soviet Union is a continental power primarily reliant not upon sea lanes but upon road, rail and inland waterways largely internal to the Soviet border, and so this fundamental asymmetry cannot be overlooked or minimized in any discussion of naval forces. Now, I know, by analogy at least, that the Soviet Union is interested in constitutional changes within its own country. It is a fundamental precept of our constitutional law, when we talk about equal protection of the law, and that in essence is what we are talking about in terms of arms control agreements—equal protection by treaty or by law—that under our Constitution, if you take two people who are similarly situated and you treat them differently, that is a denial of equal protection.

By contrast, I would argue, if you take two people who are not similarly situated and you treat them equally, that is also a denial of equal protection of the law, and I would say most particularly that applies in the field of naval forces. This asymmetry cannot be reconciled by any test of equality of application. Limitations upon our naval forces or their operations would inherently disadvantage the United States far more than the Soviet Union, and so taking two countries that are not similarly situated and treating them similarly would result in a fundamental denial of equal protection of the law by treaty or otherwise.

I believe Soviet proposals to limit the number, size and length of naval exercises, by way of example, would have very little effect upon Soviet naval activities while seriously interfering with our own, including our ability to conduct those exercises with our allies.

Moreover, U.S. naval forces are not geared solely against a potential Soviet threat, and even if the Soviet Union were to become a Jeffersonian democracy tomorrow—and tomorrow may be too soon, but hopefully within a short time frame—the United States would continue to have worldwide interests that need to be protected by naval forces, so I think it is very appropriate that both the U.S. and Soviet officials should be considering and discussing what additional steps could be taken independently or, indeed, cooperatively, to reduce international tensions and the risk of conflict.

But at the same time, it is worth noting that the arms control agenda currently before our two countries is already full, if not overloaded. The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in the most complicated, difficult set of arms control negotiations ever undertaken, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, with the conventional forces in Europe, the START talks, the negotiations on global chemical weapons, and talks to finalize the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty. I think most of us can foresee follow-on negotiations of these treaties with a CFE–II to lower the CFE–I ceilings and extend limits on

U.S. and Soviet troops to other European armies. A START II negotiation to seek deeper, more stabilizing reductions in strategic forces and further discussions on limitation of the nuclear testing.

I think a review of the world situation reveals a number of threats to international peace that need increased attention, and, not surprisingly, none of them involve limiting naval forces. I would simply point out the need to reduce the proliferation of ballistic missile and chemical and nuclear weapons technology, resolving the on-going conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia, trying to diffuse the tensions between Pakistan and India, preparing for arms control and confidence-building measures on the Korean Peninsular, the prospects for which I believe are improving.

We have all of these issues to contend with, and I believe that we have, in essence, a buffet table that is overflowing with arms control dishes, and we ought to try and conclude, or at least consume, some of those dishes rather than increasing the load currently on the table.

So with those comments, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from Marshal Akhromeyev. I am sure we will all find it to be very enlightening.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

The chairman of the committee.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much the opportunity to say a couple of words this morning.

First, Marshal Akhromeyev, we welcome you here for, I believe, your first appearance on the Senate side, and we are delighted to have you here.

Mr. Chairman, I think this is a very important hearing. We will be discussing matters of tremendous concern to both the United States as well as the Soviet Union. I think it is a rare opportunity for those of us in this committee to hear from one of the most influential leaders in the Soviet military and also a top adviser to President Gorbachev.

I think when the history of the U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1980s and 1990s is written, one of the features which has not been given the attention it deserves is the unique dialogue that is taking place between the top echelons of the U.S. and Soviet military. The trip that Admiral Crowe made to the Soviet Union 2 or 3 years ago, when our distinguished guest today was his host, was one of the most remarkable dialogues that I have known anything about during my Senate career. The return trip to our country that our distinguished guest this morning made as the guest of Admiral Crowe was also a very unique experience.

I think the dialogue between top military leaders of our two countries is one of the real breakthroughs that we have had in the last 10 or 15 years. In spite of all the arms control agreements and the importance of those agreements, the understanding that lies behind those agreements, particularly the understanding between the military on both sides, may well determine whether those agreements are long term benefits to mankind.

So this dialogue that we have seen between the top two military leaders in the Soviet Union and the United States is indeed a major part of the history of our two countries and, I think a very constructive part. I consider this appearance this morning also in that vein.

So Marshal, we welcome you. Chairman Kennedy, we appreciate your bringing this hearing to us.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you very much.

The ranking minority member of the full committee, Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, first the committee and, indeed, the Senate is grateful to you for establishing this dialogue with the Marshal this morning. I know it was the result of a personal trip you made to the Soviet Union at which time you extended this invitation.

I join with others in looking forward to hearing your views, Marshal, but I would have to say that I approach the subject of naval arms control with great reservation and great caution. I join with Senator Nunn in commending you on your work with Admiral Crowe. Indeed, in the discussions that you and I have had you have clearly said that those discussions, on an equal footing with a professional like yourself, gave you an entirely new insight into our Nation and the motives we have, which are all peaceful, in connection with decisions made for the security of this country and of our allies.

I join in commenting with Senator Cohen. I think he explained very carefully the historical precedence going back to our Constitution when the founders of this Nation recognized the importance of the Navy and clearly directed the Congress of the United States to, at all times, maintain a navy and to raise armies at such times as we felt it was necessary.

So the roots of the Navy go very deep into this Nation. As a matter of fact, it would be my judgment that any arms control arrangement of the proportions of the significance of a START or a CFE would not be ratified by the U.S. Senate under the advise and consent clause. That is the opinion of this Senator.

Nevertheless, I think there are some valuable areas that should be explored. First I would like to address just a little bit of history of naval arms control. It is not proven to be effective. This is reflected in the failure of the Washington Naval Treaty and the London Naval Treaties of the interwar period in stemming the tide of tension in the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is for those reasons I am opposed to the possibility of limiting the quantitative or qualitative aspects of U.S. naval forces.

With respect to other arms control elements, again I am concerned about proposals to limit nuclear munitions at sea. First, the monitoring, the elimination of all tactical sea-based nuclear systems or even certain classes of tactical nuclear weapons is, in my judgment, unable to lend itself to verification. Absent a verification procedure in which both sides could have confidence, then you have the potential for instability, the temptation for cheating, and it becomes destabilizing.

Second, discussions on naval arms control to date have not addressed the problems of naval aviation for which the Soviet Union has very impressive and growing capabilities. The Soviet naval aviation using nuclear weapons could effectively compensate for the elimination on surface vessels and, indeed, subsurface vessels of such systems at sea.

Now the one area which I think we should continue to explore and which I heartily encourage is what we call confidence-building measures.

The chairman mentioned the Incidents at Sea Agreement. I had the privilege of representing this country as the chief negotiator for 2 years when I was Under Secretary and Secretary of the Navy in fashioning that agreement with Admiral Gorshkov, a very distinguished naval person in our century. That was a confidence-building measure, and it should not—and I underline "not"—be considered an arms control measure.

There, both nations had as a common objective to provide safety at sea. We achieved it in the agreement. The agreement has worked successfully, and the two sides have met each year, high ranking individuals from both our Navy and the Soviet Navy, to review the agreement, to improve and strengthen it.

Indeed, other nations have looked to that particular agreement as a very effective tool in confidence building. So I would hope that we would continue in that area, but I have to tell you in all sincerity I have grave concerns about the overall subject of naval arms control given the inequality in our dependence on the sea as opposed to that of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my statement inserted for the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave for the White House. I ask for unanimous consent that my statement appear in the record.

Senator KENNEDY. It will appear in the record as if read.

[The prepared statements of Senator Warner and Senator Thurmond follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome Marshal Akhromeyev to the committee to hear his government's views on naval arms control. Over the past 5 years, Moscow has been particularly vocal regarding naval arms control proposals. These proposals are wide-ranging, involving both comprehensive limits on specific nuclear systems as well as confidence-building measures on naval operations.

Before we begin this hearing, I would like to comment on the concept of naval arms control. I make these observations from the perspective of not only a U.S. Senator on this committee, but also principally as a former Secretary of Navy and as the chief negotiator to the Incidents at Sea Agreement which I signed on behalf of the U.S. Government.

When we examine the concept of arms control there are certain principles the U.S. Government has outlined as *sine qua nons* for an effective agreement. First, an agreement must enhance U.S. national security and that of our allies; second, it must reduce the risk of war; third, it must strengthen global stability; and fourth, it must be verifiable. In my opinion, many of the existing Soviet proposals do not meet these requirements.

In examining the feasibility and need for U.S.-Soviet naval arms control agreements, we see that the issue is very complex and must take into account many factors beyond those associated with security requirements of the two countries. Foremost among those factors is the geographic location of the United States vis-a-vis our national security commitments and economic interests. As JCS Chairman Colin Powell noted in his presentation for the recent Military Doctrine Seminar in Vienna:

"Reflecting the fact that the United States is a maritime nation dependent on the seas for security and commerce, the Constitution [of the United States] granted Congress the right to provide for and to maintain navies, but to raise armies only when needed . . . . We will continue to adhere to the distinction as laid down in the Constitution between raising armies and maintaining navies. We are like an island astride two great oceans. To our east, our security commitments and economic well-being lie across the Atlantic; to our west our security commitments and economic well-being lie within the Pacific . . . naval forces can provide security to ourselves and to our allies. But there are two things navies cannot do; they cannot seize territory and they cannot, by themselves, win wars."

While our roads of commerce and security requirements are on the high seas, we must contrast this to the Soviet Union, which is a great land-based military power stretching across two continents. Its allies and trading partners are likewise on the same landmass. Its rail networks and roads are equivalent to our sea lines of communication. The United States is dependent on natural resources overseas. The Soviet Union has no equivalent reliance on foreign resources.

Moreover, the history of naval arms control has not proven to be effective. This is reflected in the failure of the Washington Naval Treaty and the London Naval Treaties of the interwar period in stemming the tide of tension in the Atlantic and the Pacific. For these reasons, I am opposed to the possibility of limiting the quantitative and qualitative aspects of naval forces.

With respect to other aspects of naval arms control, I am opposed to the elimination of nuclear munitions at sea. First, monitoring the elimination of all tactical sea-based nuclear systems, or even certain classes of tactical nuclear weapons, is not effectively verifiable. The potential for changing the military balance through cheating is too potentially destabilizing. Second, discussions on naval arms control, to date, have not addressed the problem of naval aviation, for which the Soviet Union has impressive capabilities. Soviet naval aviation, using nuclear munitions, could effectively compensate for the elimination of such systems at sea.

The one area for which naval arms control may have some usefulness is in the arena of confidence building measures. In this area, however, the United States is currently engaged in negotiations. Like the Incidents at Sea agreement, the U.S. is negotiating similar measures through bilateral efforts or through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Indeed, last June, Admiral Crowe and General Yazov signed a new agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, which expands upon the Incidents at Sea agreement of 1972.

I am not a proponent, however, of limitations or confidence building measures such as nuclear free zones or prohibitions on anti-submarine warfare in certain waters of the world. Such agreements have never proven to be effective as confidence-building measures and could, in fact, promote regional instabilities.

In short, Mr. Chairman, I believe the usefulness of naval arms control is limited and that current U.S. activities at the CSCE forum and other bilateral initiatives are the most effective means to promote stability in the naval arena.

Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to join you and the other members of the Armed Services Committee in welcoming Marshal Akhromeyev. These are truly historical times in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We are seeing barriers fall that only a year ago stood as impregnable fortresses. Although not earth shaking as the events of the past year, today's hearing is another event that few—if any of us—could have forecast last year at this time.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the world is a safer place because of the changes in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the last year, we have seen more progress toward a true peace than at any other time in my life time—which just happens to covers a good bit of history.

I support the Conventional Forces in Europe talks and applaud the significant progress the Soviet Union and the United States are making in mutually reducing our strategic nuclear arsenals. However, my support stops at naval arms negotiations. I am not convinced that any negotiated reductions in our naval arms is in the best interest of the United States or for that matter the rest of the world.

Over the past 40 years the disparity in the conventional forces facing each other in Europe and the continued Soviet strategic modernization of their heavy ICBM forces were the most destabilizing factors in the relationships between NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and our two nations. We have made significant progress toward reducing these flash points, but we have yet to reach an agreement.

Until we see the final outcome of the ongoing negotiations, I see no need to rush into yet another series of negotiations. Over the past 40 years, the Soviet Union and the United States have reached agreements on safe navigation of the seas. Our navies have shared the expanses of the ocean and although we have had some minor disagreements they did not threaten the security of either nation.

I believe that the Soviet Union has the right to be secure in its own borders. Our conventional naval forces, however, are not focused solely on the Soviet Union. Their role is to maintain the freedom of the sea and to keep open the sea lanes upon which the economic survival of this Nation and the rest of the world depends.

The United States is a maritime nation and depends on sea power for its survival; the Soviet Union does not. I think it would be foolish to enter negotiations with any country which has nothing to lose, but everything to gain by the reduction in the very forces upon which our survival hinges.

Marshal Akhromeyev, I welcome the exchange of ideas that will certainly come about from today's hearing. You have been at the forefront of President Gorbachev's efforts to change Soviet Society to a more democratic society. I wish both you and President Gorbachev continued success.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **KENNEDY**. Marshal, we are delighted to have you here, and we look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. SERGEY AKHROMEYEV, MARSHAL, ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.S.R., AS INTERPRETED BY PETER AFANASENKO, STATE DEPARTMENT

Marshal **AKHROMEYEV**. Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to express my gratitude for the invitation to testify at your hearing today. So far as I know, this is the first time a Soviet military man has addressed the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services; therefore, if I commit any errors in the hearing procedure today, I beg your indulgence.

Today on May 8, 1990 we celebrate the 45th anniversary of our joint victory over Hitler's Germany. During the Second World War, we acted together but later and for a long time we have been separated, and there were times when we even confronted each other. Relations between our countries have improved considerably in the last 5 years. Perhaps the main indication of this we can see in broader context between our people and in a greater objectivity of the information that we have about each other much more so than before.

The Soviet Union and the United States have signed and are now successfully implementing the INF Treaty on medium range missiles. Military confrontation and mutual mistrust are becoming gradually things of the past, and tensions are reducing. Though it is not easy, negotiations on a number of major military and political problems including the reduction of strategic nuclear arms and reduction of armed forces in Europe are advancing to their completion.

All this has happened as a result of changes in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and of the United States and as a result of hard work and a number of summit meetings between President Reagan and later President Bush with President M.S. Gorbachev.

The legislative bodies of our countries also make considerable contributions to the improvement of our relations. During a short period of time, U.S. Senate delegations headed by Senators Mitchell and Gore have visited the U.S.S.R. Recently we received in Moscow Senator Kennedy, the honorable chairman of today's session.

The INTERPRETER. Senators, I am just going to go ahead and read the statement without the Russian.

A delegation of Congressmen headed by Chairman Les Aspin was received by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense. In turn, several Soviet parliamentary delegations were received in the Senate, the House of Representatives and within the Armed Forces of the United States.

Military leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States also make contributions to the improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Admiral William Crowe, former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took the lead in 1987 in contacts between military men of our countries. At present General Colin Powell from your side and General of the Army Moiseyev from our side are promoting these good efforts.

Soviet people's notion about the U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. is changing gradually. Evidently, something like that takes place even in the United States as well. We in the Soviet Union say to our people that today the United States and their allies do not intend—and we are confident of this—do not intend to unleash war against our country, and this is no small achievement.

For you it may seem strange, but our people, because of the reality of having established relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States and the spreading of mutual hostility from both sides have lived for more than 40 years with the feeling of ceaseless threat of aggression coming from the United States. In the United States, people were of the same opinion about the U.S.S.R.

We are confident that in the 1990s the political means of achieving national security of states must become predominant. The role of military means in preserving peace must constantly be reduced. The Soviet Union persistently intends to secure this. Supreme Soviet demands this. It is the foundation of the policy of our President, Mr. Gorbachev.

As a member of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., I can tell you that our highest body of power comes forward in order to normalize more and more the Soviet-American relations. The Supreme Soviet will do its best for this purpose. We hope that actions of the appropriate legislative and executive organs in the United States will be approximately the same.

But we have to be frank. It is a necessity in negotiations and contacts between the Soviet and U.S. representatives. If we intend to move forward in our relations, the question is justified. Is everything so good in relations between our countries and has military threat and the reasons that give birth to this threat, have they all disappeared?

As a citizen of my country I worry in the first place about military threat to the Soviet Union and to its allies. My opinion is based on facts, and it follows. No, today not everything is good in relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. We see a cause of military threat to our country and the fact that up until now and in spite of all the changes that took place in the world and in Europe due to the Soviet Union's initiatives, the United States and NATO in some cases carry out a policy from a position of strength in regard to the Soviet Union.

Of course, there are some considerable changes in U.S. policy. We appreciate the opinion of President George Bush that the time has come to leave the frames of the deterrent concept and shift to a better peace with the U.S.S.R. We hope that the concept of America in New Europe about which the President spoke in Oklahoma on the 4th of May will take into account U.S.S.R. interests in a larger degree than has been the case in the past.

However, the state of affairs is such that this is slowly being realized. The U.S. policy in military affairs is being changed least of all. Even in 1990 Defense Secretary Cheney had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell assert that the Soviet Union remains the principal enemy of the United States for a foreseeable period of time into the future, that the United States will follow, as before, the strategic concept of forward defenses. But this strategy creates military threat to the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union has worked out and is realizing in practice a defensive military doctrine. It is unilaterally reducing its armed forces. Our armed forces are already being cut by 350,000 men, and by the end of 1990 will be cut by 500,000 more. And this reduction affects our navy.

The grouping of Warsaw Treaty armed forces in Central Europe has been fundamentally changed, but NATO does not respond to this in its military planning. Its armed forces are not being reduced. Moreover, even the offensive "strategy of flexible response" adopted in 1967 has not changed up until now, even. Who is NATO preparing to fight with this? Its political declarations have one sense and one meaning, but military preparations demonstrate quite another approach. And we hope that the forthcoming meeting of the NATO Council will take this into consideration.

NATO does not agree during negotiations on confidence and security-building measures in Europe to spread these measures and extend them to naval and air strike forces of the two military alliances. At the same time, it is seeking to apply and broaden more strictly such measures with respect to the ground forces.

To my mind, the United States in trying to include future united Germany in NATO is acting to the detriment of the Soviet Union security, interests, and it sufficiently takes into account the Soviet people's apprehensions. It would be an expedient action to weigh and think about whether such a policy brings more peace and security in Europe or not.

Why is there such a discrimination and one-sided actions? Evidently in connection with the question about Germany and the Soviet-American relations, I think we will have to pass through some very uneasy times and tests.

In the Soviet Union, the apprehension is growing because of the U.S. administration's refusal, constant refusal to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the reduction of naval forces and on bilateral or multilateral basis, either one, which I shall mention below. It would be dangerous for the cause of peace for the United States to build an anti-ballistic missile defense system. Certainly the creation of such a system is the U.S.'s own business, but we do not agree with the estimation of the consequences concerning the creation of this system in the United States presented by some of your political and military leaders.

According to the opinion in the Soviet Union, if ABM systems in the United States, especially its space attack components become a reality, and your representatives insist on it at the Geneva talks, the 1972 ABM Treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the United States will become invalid, and the effect of the 50 percent strategic offensive arms and reduction treaty being prepared today will become purposeless and dangerous for the U.S.S.R. The strategic nuclear arms race, including qualitative new weapons will become inevitable with all ensuing negative consequences for the world.

During the negotiations on 50 percent reductions of strategic offensive arms, the United States continues to obtain unilateral advantages detrimental to U.S.S.R. security. I am speaking about it not to demand something. It is senseless. It is pointless. I am your guest, and I am far from this. I am saying all this in order to make everything clear. Such U.S. actions directly influence the very foundations of the Soviet Union's defense policy in the 1990s. I think that for us and for you it is more clear now that the military buildups of the Soviet and U.S. Armed Forces are closely interdependent.

If the U.S. finds it possible to take into consideration our concern for which, as I tried to explain, there are very real grounds, the Soviet Union policy in the field of national security as a whole and in the building of the armed forces in particular would be different in many respects. It would be mutually beneficial for both of our countries.

Then there is perestroika in our country. As a military specialist I cannot describe it exhaustively. I shall speak in very short terms.

In economic relations, political systems and national relations, all are being fundamentally changed. It is a complicated and painful process. In essence, it is a revolution which we are making in a peaceful way. Sometimes it creates crises. The world outlook and mutual relations of dozens of millions of people are changing simultaneously. As a result, there are debates among people as to more appropriate ways of developing our country. For us it is a completely new problem.

We took the path of creating a multi-party state. Our views on the problems of national security are being changed largely in terms of military doctrine, matter and volume of the defensive sufficiency which are being defined now more and more exactly.

In general, perestroika is a radical turn in our way of life. We firmly intend to realize it without resorting to force. Not everything we achieve is given to us easily and in a short period of time. Perestroika is going ahead under the conditions of glasnost and openness and the deepening of democracy.

Our people have never lived or worked in this way. None of us, including our leaders knows how to do a lot of things in democracy because we are still learning. There are very large groups in society that oppose each other and that are hostile to each other. As a result there are many great influences, complications, sometimes crisis situations. I think that those people in the United States who try to estimate impartially the situation arising in our country should take all of this into account.

For these 5 years I have met many Americans, prominent leaders, common people. They differently estimate and view our situation. Some think that perestroika's defeat is inevitable. Some assume that it is already a success. It is your business and your right how you look at it. We are confident that difficulties could be overcome. We shall make perestroika a success.

I should like to say only that there is no need to interfere into our domestic affairs in arguments, no need to teach us how to solve our own problems. But you in the United States have to take the solutions which in one way or another concern the U.S.S.R. and take a look at them. Therefore, in a sensitive way and in trying to be sensitive in making our estimations, it is necessary for you in assessing these situations to look at perestroika in the U.S.S.R. as something which is favorable and to the benefit of the United States, and you might look at what actions would be better for you overall.

It would be useful if there is a clear understanding in the United States that the Soviet people have made their choice. We are and will be a state of socialist systems with our own way of life and with our own values. We firmly try to have our choice respected by others, and in turn we respect the choice of social systems made by any people in any country. Every nation and all people of any particular country, whatever their choice, still have the right to it as well as to their own security.

Let me now turn to the problem of the banning and total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and United States in naval forces. The Soviet Union considers that nuclear weapons which threaten mankind's existence must be completely eliminated. It was declared in January 1986 and since that time our country holds this opinion invariably. The United States speaking about a substantial reduction of nuclear weapons, nevertheless, says that countries should have a definite amount of nuclear weapons as a means to parry a blow and to prevent various surprises.

This difference in long-term aims in relation to nuclear weapons does not prevent our countries from carrying on numerous bilateral and multilateral negotiations or in reaching major agreements on their reduction. The 1972 ABM Treaty, the SALT I Treaty, the 1987 treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the United States on the elimination of intermediate range missiles are all being fulfilled and implemented successfully.

On the whole, negotiations on 50 percent cuts of strategic offensive arms may be estimated and considered as successful. This year, due to well known reasons, these negotiations have received an additional impulse. In December 1989 during the Malta summit, the Soviet Union suggested to the United States to start talks on total elimination on the mutual base of tactical nuclear weapons of naval forces, with the exclusion of intercontinental submarine launched ballistic missiles, which are the subject of negotiations on the strategic offensive arms arena. The suggestion includes total elimination of mutual bases within an agreed period—the suggestion includes total elimination within an agreed period of time of sea launch cruise missiles of longer and smaller ranges with nuclear warheads, nuclear missile torpedoes, torpedoes and mines of different types and all other nuclear weapons in the United States and U.S.S.R. naval forces arsenals.

We admit the possibility of singling out long range sea launched cruise missiles as a separate problem. We know that that is a possibility. For all that, tactical nuclear weapons means nuclear warheads, but not missiles and other launchers of naval weapons. To our minds such a proposal would be just as advantageous for both sides.

If the proposal is accepted to start these talks, the nuclear weapons of one of the armed services would be eliminated. It would be a real breakthrough in the reduction of nuclear weapons as a whole that would influence the international situation in a very favorable way. It would immeasurably quiet and provide safety not only at seas and oceans, but throughout the world in general.

Making the suggestion to eliminate tactical naval nuclear weapons, we took into account that it concerned vital interests of the U.S.S.R. and the United States. At the same time, according to our specialists' estimation, the U.S.S.R. and the United States have nearly the same number of tactical nuclear warheads. Thus, the two sides would eliminate nearly the same part of their nuclear potentials. The correlation of total nuclear might of the U.S.S.R. and the United States would not be changed in the case if an agreement was concluded.

The Soviet Union also takes into consideration the U.S. Navy's superiority in fighting strength as compared to the Soviet Navy. Today the correlation of Soviet and U.S. Navies is in favor of the United States. The ratio is 1:2 in large surface ships including aircraft carriers with nuclear-capable aircraft where there is absolute superiority. The United States has 20 aircraft carriers. The U.S.S.R. has none. 1:2.5 in naval aviation, 1:2 in the tonnage of the navy. The Soviet Navy has a certain advantage in submarines mainly of a diesel type. The U.S.S.R. has 260 multipurpose submarines and 113 of them are nuclear powered.

If the treaty on the elimination of tactical naval nuclear weapons of both countries were signed, the correlation of naval forces would not become in favor of the Soviet Union.

We in the Soviet Union are firmly confident that the United States would lose nothing with the elimination of tactical naval nuclear weapons. On the contrary, according to the Soviet naval specialists' estimates, the U.S. advantage would be even greater.

We in the Soviet Union consider that the tactical naval nuclear weapons are less protected against non-sanctioned actions than nuclear weapons of other armed services because of the unavoidable autonomous sea patrols of every ship carrying out training combat tasks.

With due regard for all of the above-mentioned circumstances, the U.S.S.R. thought that its proposal to eliminate all tactical naval nuclear weapons might be met by the United States with a positive response. However, it did not happen. The American side found our proposal as not corresponding to U.S. interests, and declined it.

We regret that.

Meditating and thinking on why this happened, we came to this conclusion. The main reason, evidently, is that the United States does not intend to have talks on reductions of naval weapons as a matter of principle. It is in order to avoid a precedent and to provide no occasion in the future for negotiations on naval force reductions in general that no consent is given today to negotiations on the elimination of tactical naval nuclear weapons.

We consider that, sooner or later, if we do not want to stop these negotiations on reduction of nuclear and conventional arms, naval force cut negotiations are unavoidable.

You know the negotiations on strategic offensive arms reductions, mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Europe, on banning chemical weapons, and so on, are now ongoing. But there are no negotiations on naval forces reductions whatsoever. Speaking frankly, the world community does not understand this.

The Soviet people see in this refusal as the desire of the United States, having achieved agreement with us on the ground forces reductions in Europe, and the United States and their allies are interested in it and we agreed to do it, and simultaneously, in building up your naval forces without any control, to gain, on this basis, military superiority, and from a position of strength, to dictate to the Soviet Union the conditions of future Soviet/American relations.

Quite recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, told me that in view of the world situation, as an interest of the United States as a state, which has global interest, they cannot accept any limitations in the buildup in activity of the Navy.

Moreover, it was declared by the U.S. administration in its report to the Congress on the 20th of March of this year "Strategy of the United States in National Security," in that piece the U.S. position was laid out.

What would happen in Europe today if the Soviet Union took the same position concerning ground forces? But the Soviet Union has made radical changes in military forces in correlation between the two which took place in Europe.

It is true that in the United States many people say that the U.S.S.R. was compelled to do this. Let them keep this on their conscience. And does the United States continue to act? Forty years ago they encircled the Soviet Union with a network of military bases, deployed there the grouping of their forces consisting of 500,000 officers and men, with a strong air force and naval presence. Yet, up till now, these bases have not been reduced.

If the United States wants to have agreements with the Soviet Union, such a position is not understandable.

The beginning of Soviet/American negotiations on naval cuts, and a definite limitation on naval forces activities at sea and oceans is today one of the decisive preconditions for the improvement of relations between our countries and strengthening of confidence.

Moreover, we have no intention to do damage to the United States' legitimate interests.

The understanding of the U.S.S.R. national security policy by the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services and the U.S. policy in the same field by the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense is of great significance that allows your and our legislative bodies to compare more objectively mutual actions and activities of the governments concerning national security.

It would be useful to come to an arrangement so that the committees on armed forces of both countries could have an opportunity to ask each other for additional explanations concerning military/political problems and budget allocations and to take a look at possible dangers and consequences of different actions of the other side. Such relations between the committees, if they are established, would make it possible to take decisions on their armed forces development, bearing in mind and taking into account the other side's actions.

Today it looks very unusual, but in the future, if relations between our countries are improved, it would be quite realistic.

The Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense would, in case of your request, give the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services necessary explanations concerning Soviet policy in the sphere of national security, military doctrine, and strategy. We could clarify separate concrete and specific questions. We expect to have reciprocal corresponding information from your side.

Naturally an official or unofficial agreement could be reached between the chairmen of the committees.

The Soviet Union firmly intends to follow defensive military doctrine and to have the armed forces limited to defense-required sufficiency.

Taking into account the anxiety of Western European countries, the Soviet Union, at the Vienna talks, is working for a radical reduction of the land forces and air forces of the two sides. The U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Treaty allies are ready to have in Europe minimal armed forces capable of repulsing an aggression, but not capable of launching extensive offensive operations.

Naturally it will be possible if NATO has the same position.

The Soviet Union is really ready to reduce armed forces and to recognize them in such a way that mutual reliable security could become a reality. We expect the same from NATO. We intend to have the strategic nuclear forces approximately equal to that of the United States. Now we do not strive and will not in the future try to gain superiority in this field. But we do not accept an advantage on the American side either.

We intend to successfully finish negotiations to prepare the treaty on eliminating 50 percent of the strategic arms of the sides on a just basis, which was laid down here in Washington in December 1987 to sign and ratify this treaty. Of course, it will be possible if the ABM Treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the United States stays the way it was signed in 1972 and is implemented in that same way.

We are ready to have further negotiations to strengthen strategy stability between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

With all of what I have mentioned above, the Soviet Union expects the United States to understand our concern with regard to naval forces. According to my deep belief and understanding of these affairs, when all the armed services of the two sides except the naval forces are a subject of negotiations, and undergo reductions, but the naval forces as of now are untouched, the Soviet

Union and our people are deeply concerned because of this U.S. policy in naval armaments.

We think that this policy is unjust and is aimed at undermining security and in gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union. If it is pursued later on, it will be impossible to achieve radical reductions of armed forces and arms in the world. It is necessary to start Soviet/American negotiations on reduction of naval forces.

It would be a mistake to think that the U.S.S.R., due to internal or foreign policy considerations, accepts the situation when the navies are excluded from the talks. No, it is necessary to include all armed services and armaments of the sides into the talks and have corresponding reductions.

Our proposal to start negotiations on the elimination of naval tactical nuclear weapons of the sides is still valid.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, allow me once again to express my gratitude for this possibility to testify at your hearing on one of the most important problems which determine the level and state of Soviet/American relations. In its turn, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Defense Committee is prepared to hear your subcommittee's representative at its session on the questions being considered today.

Mr. Chairman, I have finished my statement and thank you all for your attention.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, thank you very much, Marshal Akhromeyev, for a very complete commentary on the current view of the Soviet military and people, the American military capability and your current assessment of the situation between our two countries.

Marshal, I have a chart over here which I think will help frame the question that I am about to pose to you. This chart considers the naval nuclear weapons. This is the United States and the Soviet Union and these are the ballistic missile warheads which are being considered in the START negotiations.

NAVAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

	BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS	SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES	TACTICAL WEAPONS BOMBS
ARSENALS			
US	5000	300	2200
USSR	3600	50-350	2700-3000
ARMS CONTROL	START (Limits would reduce both arsenals)	START SIDE AGREEMENT (Both sides declare SLCM deployments)	NO CONSTRAINTS

Then we have the sea-launched cruise missiles that are being considered in the START with a side agreement. I will come back to that.

The third column is the tactical weapons and bombs, where currently there are no negotiations which are taking place. Some 2,200 by the United States, and estimates of 2,700 to 3,000 in the Soviet Union.

Are you proposing that there be negotiations that would eliminate all of the tactical nuclear weapons? Do I understand you correctly?

That includes the nuclear torpedoes, the depth charges and the very short-range missiles. We can get into the range of some of these and go back and forth on the numbers. I do not try and dismiss that lightly. I am basically trying to direct your attention to what was generally considered in the framework of tactical weapons and bombs.

Is this conceptual? We are not in the process of negotiations here today, but what we are interested in is the basic concept.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Mr. Chairman, I understood you. You are absolutely right. The numbers that you see on the right in the third column, I of course cannot answer for their veracity there, but if one were to be candid, I cannot even answer for the Soviet Union. I do not know if that is the number we have. And especially, we do not know what the United States has.

But, in principle, we think and we consider that the number of tactical nuclear weapons out at sea from both your country and our country is approximately even. Our proposal calls for these very items to become the subject of negotiations. It is precisely these that we want to have negotiations on and come to agreement on their elimination.

Senator KENNEDY. We will have a 10-minute limitation on time. I will ask the staff to keep track of it.

Would Moscow be prepared to include the shore-based naval aviation in the negotiations?

As Senator Warner pointed out, the United States views these weapons as the biggest nuclear threat at sea, primarily the Backfire bomber armed with nuclear cruise missiles. The Soviet Union has sought to exclude Soviet naval aviation from both the START and the CFE talks. Should not they be included in negotiations on naval nuclear weapons?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. We think that nuclear weapons of all kinds of systems at sea should be the subject of negotiation; in other words, the nuclear systems which are deployed on aircraft carriers, on submarines and on aviation.

Senator KENNEDY. The United States' configuration provides that its naval air is on aircraft carriers, and the United States as a matter of policy has decided that this is the best way to secure our national interest. Those aircraft carriers are primarily utilized in low intensity conflicts.

Let me come back to this point. The United States' naval air is tied to aircraft carriers. The Soviet Union has land-based air that is tied to the protection of its sea units.

As part of its strategy, should any kind of negotiation which is trying to deal with both our nations' interests at sea to reduce tactical nuclear weapons include those elements in the Soviet defense that are tied to protect its naval assets? That would be the land-based air and particularly the Backfire bombers which today are not included either in START or in CFE and I think most military experts would agree are tied to the protection of Soviet naval assets.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. We think independently of where naval aviation is based, be it on board aircraft carriers or land-based aerodrones. Organizationally this kind of aviation is part and parcel of the military components of the naval kind and, therefore, the subject of negotiations would be the aviation of any kind of units and all kinds of units of naval forces. Included there would be nuclear weapons on aviation, be it based on land or nuclear weapons on aviation based out at sea.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

I would like to ask your opinion about the possibility of reaching limits on nuclear attack submarines. In Moscow, you suggested an agreement that would reduce Soviet submarines in exchange for U.S. aircraft carrier reductions, and such a tradeoff would be difficult for the United States to accept because of the importance of the carriers in protecting our interests around the world. The primary role of our carriers now is in low intensity conflicts, not to defend against Soviet submarines.

For the Soviet Union, fewer U.S. nuclear attack submarines would reduce the threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines, enhancing deterrence, and for the United States, fewer Soviet nuclear attack submarines would reduce the threat to our sea lanes.

Lines of communications means supplying our overseas allies and facilitating our ability to draw down forces in Europe as part of CFE. Would Moscow be prepared to explore mutual limits on nuclear attack submarines?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Mr. Chairman, in your introductory words you very fairly and properly said that here we are not carrying on negotiations at the hearing. The administration of your government and the administration of our government are the ones who are actually doing the negotiating. We are sitting here just having an exchange of opinions.

Apparently, prior to beginning any negotiations there would be quite a lot to do in order to lay out the framework for any potential talks in sort of an overall structure. Why is it that in our Vienna negotiations now on conventional forces things are moving ahead rather well? The reason is prior to starting those talks we very carefully defined the subject of those talks in Vienna, and we did some work on that.

If our two countries were, for instance, to agree to begin talks on, let us say, tactical nuclear weapons of our navies, what we would do is carefully circumscribe the limits of those negotiations in order that neither your interests nor our interests be impacted. Then we would be able to see how to look at and compare the balances, say, between and among the different submarine units of the two sides, other units and other kinds of systems.

Right now it is very difficult to say.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. My time is up. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Marshal Akhromeyev, I found your statement to be interesting in many senses, but one that struck me is that it appears to either ignore changes that are taking place within NATO or to ignore statements coming from the Congress as well as the administration.

For example, you have indicated there have been no cuts in NATO forces. I would respectfully suggest that there are substantial cuts being proposed for NATO forces.

You have indicated that there is no response on the part of the NATO forces in terms of weapons that could be targeted against Eastern Europe. I would suggest that President Bush as recently as last week indicated that we will not be following on with a follow-on to the Lance.

You also indicated in your statement that an antiballistic missile defense for the United States is unnecessary and unwise. I would agree with that particular assessment. It raised an issue in my mind as to why the Soviet Union has maintained an ABM system and until about 6 months ago maintained that the facility at Krasnoyarsk was for tracking satellites rather than as a battle management for an ABM system.

Having said that, I would like to point out that Senator Nunn and others within the U.S. Senate have adamantly opposed any interpretation of the ABM Treaty that would allow the deployment of an SDI program that is inconsistent with a very strict, narrow interpretation of ABM. So I think the statement is somewhat exaggerated in terms of the intransigence on the part of NATO or the United States. I think there has been a great deal of flexibility shown by the United States.

My understanding is in a joint statement of the Moscow Ministerial, it states that the sides also made good progress on sea launched cruise missiles. The sides agreed that such missiles would be dealt with by parallel politically binding declarations for the duration of the START Treaty.

I guess the question I have is, is your government now saying it does not accept this principle for resolving the sea launch cruise missile issue, backing away from the agreement that apparently a declaration would be sufficient to bind both governments during the duration of the START Treaty?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Senator, you asked me a couple of questions right off the bat.

Senator COHEN. I made a couple of statements.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. I am going to try to answer them in order.

We have carefully followed the statements that are being made in the United States by the administration and by Senators and statements that are made by representatives of the NATO block.

I am a military person. I proceed not from statements but from the real realities that exist. That is the way I structured my presentation. If you look at our point of view, we have certain concrete actions and steps which we have taken.

We announced that we are going to cut our armed forces. Basically, we are 75 percent complete in what we announced. We announced a 500,000 man troop cut by January 1, and we have already gone about 75 percent of the way. We have cut 350,000 out of that half million.

We announced that over a period of 2 years, we are going to cut our military budget by 14 percent, and over a period of 1 year we have already knocked it down by 8 percent of the 14.

Now as far as the United States is concerned, from your side we hear a lot of statements. We hear a lot about plans to reduce. As far as realistic cuts to be actually made adequate to the ones or corresponding to the level that we have made right now, we do not see it.

I asked some of my friends why is this so. For instance, I asked Admiral Crowe, a person of great authority, and he said under the American system to make changes of that size very quickly is awfully difficult. I allow that that could be, but that does not make life any easier for us. That is why we are worried, although we trust your statements, we respect the kinds of statements that come out of the United States, and we hope that they are actually realized.

Senator COHEN. Marshal Akhromeyev, if I could interrupt, we respect your statements as well, and you have indicated that the Soviet Union is opposed to all nuclear weapons, and yet we see a very vast modernization program under way with the deployment of SS-24s and SS-25s, with the replacement of SS-18s and SS-19s. This is sort of inconsistent with a declaration that the Soviet Union is opposed to all nuclear weapons.

I think the most important thing that we do or should do is get at the bargaining table on CFE, the Conventional Forces in Europe, to sign a treaty which calls for equal reductions or reductions to equal levels of conventional forces. I think we should move very quickly on a START agreement which embraces the points which you have agreed to with respect to sea-launched cruise missiles as far as a declaration on sea-launched cruise missiles, and move forward.

The longer there is delay, it seems to me, the less trust will be generated between our two countries.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Senator, I really do not want to argue with you. When you say that we develop and deploy SS-24s and SS-25s, I could say that there is no other country that has the B-2, Trident II, heavy bombers. In this case, we are not really complaining.

We know that that is being done within the framework and respecting all of the agreements that we have, and there are no violations. So that is why we are not complaining when we see your programs. From our side, too, what we are doing, we are not allowing any violations of any existing accords or treaties.

Now, as far as SLCMs are concerned allow me not to agree with you. Here we have an accord to act in a non-declaratory fashion, and in December 1987 there was a joint statement signed by President Reagan and President Gorbachev which stated that there should be a level set for the numbers of SLCMs each side has. And we are pushing that both sides, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, respect the levels with respect to the statements that were signed in that joint statement by the two Presidents.

There is no hardening of the Soviet position in this regard. We are merely trying to realize and put into effect that which we already have reached an accord.

Senator COHEN. There was nothing stated in the 1987 ministerial agreement concerning numerical limitations. There is absolutely nothing in that accord.

But let me ask one final question. My time is running out. Senator Kennedy asked about the proposal on the part of the Soviet Union to give up, I believe, 100 submarines in exchange for five to seven U.S. aircraft carriers. My understanding is that in 1989 the Soviet Union dismantled 30 diesel submarines because of their being obsolete, that there are roughly 50 older nuclear submarines that are likely to be dismantled because they are obsolete.

The question I would have is, why would the Soviet Union expect the United States to give up the core of its sea power capability in exchange for something which is destined for the scrap heap in the Soviet Union? You may take as long as you want to answer because my time has now expired.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Allow me to say, nonetheless, that there is an accord between President Reagan and President Gorbachev that the SLCMs be, in fact, limited. I ask you to look at the statement of December 1987.

Now as far as holding negotiations on the reduction of naval forces, to have the idea of swapping aircraft carriers for submarines, up until now nobody has really proposed that or offered that as a proposal. You see, prior to putting a proposal of that nature on the table, you have to have some kind of talks or negotiations.

We do not have negotiations, so what are we talking about?

Senator COHEN. So it was never a Soviet proposal to swap submarines for aircraft carriers?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Since I am such a fervent supporter of beginning talks and negotiations on naval arms reductions, many people have asked me what are the issues and what are the things that are happening in this area.

And I just expressed the supposition of the following nature. I said that the United States is very concerned by the multi-purpose, large, very capable nuclear submarines of the Soviet Union—as a matter of fact, nuclear and not diesel, and new ones, not old ones. So I gave them the supposition. I said maybe in the course of negotiations we might consider swapping them, these very modern submarines, and swap them for aircraft carriers.

That was only a supposition. There were no negotiations.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Based on what I have heard going on in the Pentagon, I think the Navy would be glad to get down to 15 carriers, Senator Cohen. I do not know where the count of 20 comes from, but our Navy has really 14 aircraft carriers now.

Are you counting the decks that have short take-off and landing aircraft on them to get 20 aircraft carriers?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. No, Mr. Chairman. We are counting 15 modern aircraft carriers, and in addition the two that are being built. I was shown from a helicopter overflight. They said here are the two that are being constructed now. Plus, we have helicopter-bearing ships.

Senator NUNN. Okay. We can figure out where Senators Cohen and Warner have those others hidden, I guess, later. [Laughter.]

Marshal, I was struck particularly by your statement on page 6, and let me just read it to you in English. I think it is a very significant statement, and I had not seen it before. Perhaps others have.

You say: We in the Soviet Union consider that the tactical naval nuclear weapons are less protected against non-sanctioned actions than nuclear weapons of other armed services because of unavoidable autonomous sea patrols of every ship carrying out training combat tasks.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Yes, I have found it. I understand you.

Senator NUNN. As I understand you are saying that these tactical weapons at sea are really more dangerous than tactical weapons on land in terms of accident or some kind of unauthorized action by one ship or one group of sailors. Is that what you are saying?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Of course, I have to make a correction right off the bat. I cannot answer with any authority what kinds of measures have been provided for within the U.S. Navy in order to prevent any kind of unsanctioned use or misuse of these kinds of weapons. Naturally, nobody ever familiarized me with that system, and they probably did the right thing.

But I am proceeding from the following experience. You take a ship, and that is an independent unit. On board ship you have a number of nuclear weapons that are stored. Of course you do have certain measures that are provided which would be against unsanctioned use or misuse of those kinds of systems.

But that is not at all the same kind of preventive measures that you have in major large-scale nuclear missiles, for instance, where, for all practical purposes, both sides have totally excluded any kind of unsanctioned use of those large missiles.

So in this sense you can say that weapons aboard ship are relatively less protected than, say, the large ICBM systems or other missile systems. Although both sides have very qualified crews, commanders, very responsible and well-trained people, and they each have corresponding measures that are provided against unsanctioned use, I still think that, relatively speaking, there is less protection than in other types of nuclear weapons.

Senator NUNN. Are you satisfied that the Soviet military has done all that really can be done feasibly to protect against unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear systems? I am including at-sea and on land.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Yes. We have in the Soviet Union a system for the prevention of any kinds of events taking place in an unsanctioned way in our nuclear weapons systems. Since I just very recently left the post where I was directly responsible for making sure that those systems worked, I can say that, yes, those systems work very dependably.

Senator NUNN. Do you believe that the danger of an accidental incident taking place has gone up in recent years in the Soviet Union because of the nationality problems and other problems within your country?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Well, I think that against any and all of those kinds of events that might arise we have protected our arsenals. The political leadership and our military leadership understand its responsibility not only before its own people but also before the international community. These systems are accordingly and very properly protected.

Senator NUNN. Marshal, turning to another subject. On long term arms control goals, there are a number of us who are really puzzled about where our two countries are going. All of us would like to see nuclear weapons reduced, but the whole question of stability—that is, giving both sides maximum disincentives to ever use a strategic nuclear weapon first—it seems to me ought to be the goal of arms control.

What is the reaction that you personally have to the proposition that we ought to de-MIRV or go to single warhead missiles on land and that as a first step we ought to both be willing to give up our mobile MIRVs on land, your SS-24 versus the MX rail mobile?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Mr. Chairman, you have asked a question which will probably be the very core of the future negotiations that we will have between our two countries. After we come to terms and agree and sign a START Treaty on 50 percent reduction, which I am sure will take place, then we are going to be faced with the question which you just asked. As a matter of fact, it is not an easy question because the geographic conditions in which both of our countries find themselves, the political-military scenarios that we experience in our two countries, are rather different. One type of system may be very dangerous, say, to the United States, and other kinds of systems in the eyes of the Soviet Union are much more dangerous.

I really do not want to get into a lot of details because this would take an inordinate amount of time to get into all this. It would be good if experts of our two countries in this issue of greater enhancing stability in the future would sit down and take a look at this and really study this question prior to getting into those future negotiations.

You see, that issue is already on the agenda for the day.

Senator NUNN. One other question. Do you believe that we will be able to work out some kind of verification regime on sea launch cruise missiles anytime in the near future? Do you have such a regime in mind? How do you verify a ban on sea launch cruise missiles or limitation on sea launch cruise missiles?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. We have had a difference in positions for a long time now because even now I still do not understand why American inspectors cannot come to a base in the Soviet Union, where we have deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, and check and inspect everything down to and including taking off the cover, looking at the number of warheads and counting them on the missile.

Why is it, then, that a Soviet inspector could not come to a U.S. submarine or a surface vessel and take a look and see what kind of weapons are on board? The United States refuses because this is the Navy.

Senator NUNN. I think my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I will have other questions.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Gorton.

Senator GORTON. Senator Wallop was here ahead of me.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Wallop.

Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy in allowing somebody who is not a member of your subcommittee to ask questions.

Marshal, I begin with respect for any military officer who has served his country as well and as long as you. Your foreign minister, Mr. Shevardnadze, admitted last October, I believe, that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a violation of the ABM Treaty. A recent article in the Washington Post suggests that the Soviet military rejects the position that the Krasnoyarsk ABM radar is a treaty violation.

Would you clear that up for us?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. The answer is very simple. Our foreign minister, who is a member of our government, said deployment of that radar, the Krasnoyarsk, was a violation of the ABM Treaty, and we are now dismantling it.

Senator WALLOP. I guess one of the reasons I raised the question is that there is no indication that we have noted that it is being dismantled.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. No, it is now being dismantled.

Senator WALLOP. Well, Marshal, the ABM radar is a violation. The long lead time required for the design and engineering and construction of such a vast complex indicates that the ink was hardly dry on the INF Treaty or perhaps not even on the paper before this facility was begun.

Likewise, we have recently discovered covert deployments of intermediate range ballistic missiles in two countries of Eastern Europe, and so it suggests to us or suggests to this Senator there is not much reason for pursuing treaties if the Soviet Union is going to be unwilling to abide by the terms of them.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Senator, those are two different things, because you are talking about missiles of the SS-23 type which were transferred to another country prior to the signing of the INF Treaty not to two countries, but they were sold to three countries, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. This is not a violation of the treaty. There is nothing that is said in that treaty about what had taken place prior to the signing of that treaty. As a matter of fact, those missiles were sold to those countries without nuclear warheads.

Sure, I could throw some claims out, very similar claims, against the United States, but this is not the place to do that. I told Secretary Baker recently that you, the United States, are about to deploy air launch cruise missiles with a range of longer than 600 kilometers. How are we, the Soviet Union, going to be able to distinguish which of those are nuclear armed ALCMs and which are conventional armed ALCMs.

We also are going to have quite a large degree of suspicion toward the United States if we see that happening. These issues have to be discussed and reviewed very carefully during negotiations and we have to come to terms with these.

Senator WALLOP. It was my understanding and generally reported that the negotiators asked for assurances on numerous occasions prior to the signing of the INF Treaty that those missiles had not been transferred and were assured that no such transfer had ever taken place.

Others also in the German Democratic Republic indicate that those missiles were intended to be used with nuclear warheads.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. No, Senator. I know that issue very, very well because that treaty was signed when I was still the head of our general staff. There is nothing said in that treaty on missiles that are sold prior to that treaty to any other countries, and the United States side never asked us either prior to the signing or during the signing of that treaty. The U.S. side never asked us about that. They never posed questions of that nature to us, and there has never been a single nuclear warhead or nuclear weapon in the territory of the GDR.

Senator WALLOP. Marshal, let me move on with a last question.

In your statement, in the English version—Mr. Translator, it would be the last sentence of the second paragraph on page 5—in which you say that for all that, tactical nuclear weapon means nuclear warheads but not missiles and other launchers of naval weapons.

Does that posture not essentially eliminate the capabilities of the United States while retaining basically the capabilities of the Soviet Union?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Why? We make proposals which should be even and equal for both sides to liquidate nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons of both the United States and the Soviet Union on equal terms, to establish an inspection, to check to verify to see whether all is done properly. We think that the proposal is absolutely equal and fair for both sides.

Senator WALLOP. I would just suggest that on its face the definition would appear to permit the basic Soviet capability on submarines which is missiles, not cruise missiles, and the basic capability which you seek to eliminate is United States technology with regard to cruise missiles.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Well, Senator, SLBMs would not be part and parcel of these kinds of negotiations. Those SLBM missiles are already the subject of negotiations under the START negotiations.

Here in this given phrase we are only talking about tactical nuclear missiles.

Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would just state again that, as translated, the definition would appear to be rather one-sided.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Marshal Akhromeyev, I understand you firmly believe in enforcing the concept of universal military service in the Red Army. Significant percentages of the Soviet military are comprised of ethnic minorities such as Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians, who have been inducted into the Red Army ever since the Soviet Union annexed those lands, an action I am sure you understand that the United States has never recognized.

So I will ask you how do you respond to the view held by many of us that continued insistence on military service for persons from the Baltic states constitutes a violation of the Geneva Convention, which prohibits the forced induction by an occupying force of an occupied country?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Well, Senator, you and I do not share the same opinion on this question. You consider that we in the Soviet

Union are occupying our very own country. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are Soviet Socialist Republics within the Soviet Union. They came into the Union based upon certain premises, into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as member republics.

And a young Lithuanian fellow is the same kind of soldier and member of our military forces as I am, a Russian. On the basis of law and constitution, he is called upon to serve in our armed forces. You in the United States are free to accept or not accept, recognize or not recognize how voluntarily or involuntarily those republics entered the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

We have our own laws and we are guided by those laws and legislation.

Senator DIXON. What do you believe, Marshal, is the view of the Soviet military rank and file about those very questions, secessionist efforts by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia? Do you believe that your country generally shares the view you have just expressed to those of us on this committee?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. I think the absolute majority of Soviet citizens share the point of view that I share. I invite anybody here in this room to come to the Soviet Union and talk to the average Soviet citizen. I will consider that person who comes as my guest and help him in any possible way in order to come and talk to the Soviet citizens and find out for himself.

Senator DIXON. Well, is it not a fact, Marshal, that Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution says: Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R.?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Yes, you are right. It is written like that in the Constitution, and it is the right of each republic to do so. But there is also the corresponding and appropriate procedure for seceding from the Union. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. has adopted legislation on the process of entry into and secession from the Union.

We respect the Constitution and we respect that piece of legislation. And whoever acts in accordance with that legislation we have no complaints. He who violates that law or acts in a way contrary to that legislation, we are going to be opposed to that body or person.

To say it very shortly, in accordance with the law there has to be a referendum of all the people in a republic carried out on the question of should that republic leave the Soviet Union. In Lithuania, no referendum of this kind was ever held; therefore, that legislation was violated. So our government then issues a complaint and a claim against the leadership of Lithuania.

Senator DIXON. Is it your fundamental view, then—and I ask you this very respectfully—that your country regards the pact that occurred 50 years ago between Ribbentrop and your country in which you acquired the Baltic States, is that the legal action that you predicate your view upon, that act?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Senator, I am getting to be an old man, and I was already an adult when that pact between Germany and the Soviet Union was signed. I was already in the army at that time. And we had one choice, a question rose. Do we sign a pact with Germany or is there going to be a war facing us? That was the only choice we had.

And when it comes to war, then I am sure every single citizen of the Soviet Union gets interested, as would be the case in any country. And today not a single person raises any objection or raises his hand, either in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, against that pact. Everyone thinks that when that time came, that was the right thing to do, to sign that pact.

Now it is another matter. In addition to that pact, there were also several protocols that were attached on the distribution and sharing of spheres of influence between Germany and the Soviet Union. And on the basis of those protocols the territories of those Baltic States entered into the Soviet Union's territory.

We consider that now to be illegal. And that is the question that was decided by the Congress of Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. when they made a decision on that. But the entry into the Soviet Union by those republics did not occur at that particular time. The entry occurred a year after that. And there is no distinct tie-in or connection between the pact itself and a year later the entry of these republics into the Union.

If you will allow me, gentlemen, I have to say that this business of talking about the Baltic States and entry into the Soviet Union is quite far from the topic of discussion today, which is the negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons in the navies.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, we thank you. Recognize that we, as I am sure you will find out, Marshal, we follow a tradition where any witness, as welcome as they are, are open to questions on a range of different subject matters.

Senator Gorton.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Sure. I understand.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I would like my statement to be inserted in the record in its entirety. I thank the Chair.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have with us today Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev of the Soviet Union. The mere fact that a Soviet official of the General's stature can appear before this subcommittee is a reflection of the remarkable times in which we now find ourselves. I know that the topic of this hearing is naval arms control—a challenging subject. Yet I hope that we can also cover other issues of critical importance to the U.S.-Soviet relationship and to the world.

I believe that General Akhromeyev's testimony is especially important precisely because of the rapid pace of change we have been witnessing in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As we try to make sense of dramatically new circumstances, it is imperative that both the United States and Soviet Union know as much as possible about how the other is proceeding. I think that today's hearing is an excellent opportunity to advance this process.

I also believe that in this transitional period certain events and policies merit particular attention because they can be good indicators of future directions. It is no secret that I have not been happy with the Soviet Union's approach to Lithuania's quest for independence. Moreover, I am no supporter of the administration's policy toward the Soviets regarding this matter. I am unconvinced that our two countries can realize the potential for more stable, peaceful relations if the Soviet Union continues its current policies toward Lithuania. I hope that the testimony we will hear today will provide some positive insights into this specific concern, as well as into other areas.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from today's witness.

Senator GORTON. General, I am going to subject you to the next follow-up question which I suggest that Senator Dixon would have asked. In clearing my mind on this subject, the legislative body of the Soviet Union has now recognized the invalidity of the protocols of 1939.

Are you telling us that it is the position of the Soviet Union that the occupation of those three countries against their will, the replacement of their governments and the phony referenda of 1940 are a sufficient legal ground to cause, 50 years later, those countries to be still validly Soviet Republics? Is it the position of the Soviet Union that the 1940 annexations were totally lawful and legal?

Marshal **AKHROMEYEV**. Senator, I would say you are expressing surprise. I would be surprised that people even doubt the legality of those things. There was a referendum. There were elections. There were the corresponding procedures that were followed on the basis of which those countries came into the U.S.S.R.

There are people who now do not recognize that, and there are also people who now do recognize that. That is the thing that people are arguing about. The positions on the score of the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the United States are at variance on this.

Senator **GORTON**. Well, General, I suspect you should not be surprised that there is an element of remaining distrust between our peoples if it remains the position of the Soviet Union, even in an era of glasnost, that those 1940 annexations were valid and legal.

But I will get back to the subject of this hearing. Last year a number of Soviet officials claimed that when the new Supreme Soviet reviewed the defense budget, actual arms production plans would be published which are in many respects much more realistic than ruble numbers.

So far this has not occurred. Is information of this sort going to be released for past, present, and future production of major armaments?

Marshal **AKHROMEYEV**. Senator, I feel myself kind of constrained here, not too comfortable, because I do not really know economics that well. By profession I am a military man. I am a lousy financier. But we are now undertaking steps. I am telling you now, as myself being a member of the Defense National Security Committee of the Supreme Soviet, and so that our military budget be a lot more open, a lot more developed, specifically, I think this year, starting with this year, we will have a much more detailed, much more open budget where everybody can sit down and read the military budget.

Now as far as the cost of weapons, arms, we do have problems yet in this regard—price formation, prices that we pay for raw materials. You see, we do not have yet a market-based economy. We have got a centrally-planned economy. So for certain items the government puts out a subsidy and it is not that we want to hide anything, but when you have those kind of difficulties in a centrally-planned economy there are things that just do not match in terms of prices and numbers.

So we are going to have those dysfunctions yet for a while.

Senator **GORTON**. With due regard to the fact that you are not an economist, I understand that just during the course of the last week Mr. Ligachev was quoted as saying that defense took between

18 and 20 percent of the national income of the U.S.S.R., fairly consistent with the statement that President Gorbachev made a week or so ago.

Is that, in your view, an accurate estimate of the burden of national defense on the people of the Soviet Union?

Mr. AFANASENKO. Are you talking about gross national product or national budget, sir?

Senator GORTON. My figures here say national income.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. I just do not remember the figure right offhand. I have got to look at a piece of paper. As far as national income is concerned—let us take the gross national product. In 1989, our military expenses were 8 percent of our GNP, in 1990 they became 7.5 percent of GNP. In national income now—I am giving you official data here—in 1989 it was 11 percent of national income. I took this from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defense figures.

Senator GORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Senator Gorton.

We will reduce the time to 7 minutes. We are going to have a series of votes starting around noon, and I know that you have to leave at approximately that time as well.

The main topic for today's hearing is naval arms control. In my view, this is a fruitful area for improving the securities of both nations. As I said in my opening remarks, to be successful, any naval arms control negotiation must recognize a central fact—and that is that the United States is a maritime nation that depends on the sea for its very existence, whereas the Soviet Union is a continental nation that relies less on its navy.

So the United States cannot and should not enter negotiations that would threaten our right to the freedom of the seas. The Soviet Union has made many naval arms control proposals. Some appear to recognize U.S. interests as a maritime nation and others do not.

There are three areas of naval arms control that I believe should be explored. On the naval nuclear weapons, the first, and in my view most promising proposal, would be a ban on tactical nuclear weapons at sea. I found your testimony on this subject to be very constructive, particularly your inclusion of shore-based naval aviation, which is an important new aspect of the Soviet Malta offer.

In my view, with this addition, a ban on naval nuclear weapons would enhance the security and stability of both nations.

The second area of possible progress in naval arms control is equal limits on nuclear attack submarines. Even with the retirement of older Soviet submarines that Senator Cohen noted, the Soviets will maintain a numerical advantage in nuclear submarines. In my view, if both nations reduce their submarine fleets to the same equal level, this could be beneficial to both nations. I understand this is a new proposal, but I hope that you might reflect on it.

I note that the earlier Soviet proposal to reduce subs in exchange for carriers is really a non-starter in the United States.

The third area of possible progress is naval confidence-building measures. The Soviet Union has proposed including naval forces in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Currently the CSCE mandate excludes consideration of naval forces or activities, except in very limited circumstances.

In the long run, I hope that we might build on the successful naval confidence-building measures contained in the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreements, the 1986 Stockholm Accord, and the 1989 agreement on Dangerous Military Activities.

But on a more immediate schedule, we might build confidence through unilateral data exchange. Specifically, the United States publishes substantial information about its navy—the 5-year shipbuilding plan, also the retirement and commissioning schedules of the U.S. Navy is included in that document, as well as data on the costs and capabilities of naval weapons systems. All of that is published.

You might give thought to the Soviet Union publishing similar kinds of information. The United States does it and we would hope that if you found this idea valuable that you might give it positive consideration because it would contribute, I think importantly, to the confidence-building regime by reducing mutual uncertainty about the other's procurement plans.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Allow me in conclusion to say a couple of words.

Senator KENNEDY. That would be fine. Perhaps before concluding I would be interested if you have any reaction to that part and then maybe our colleagues would conclude with any comments and then we would welcome any concluding remarks that you would have that would wind up the hearing.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Okay. I agree with you on the publishing of data on the construction program. So as far as the Navy goes, it is wider. The publication is much wider and broader in the United States than we have it. That is true.

This is tied to the fact, as I earlier explained to the respected Senator, that we now are working out the structure for the new budget and how we are going to present the budget to the public.

I think already this year, by the fall of, say, 1990, we will have a lot more wider information in the budget than we had in previous years. And you are right that in the future it will be much easier to compare programs and to compare the navies of the two sides.

But, after all, I did want to say that by itself, that exchange of information, that publishing of information will not solve the problem in and of itself. As a matter of fact, we do not want to harm the United States' interests. We do not intend to match them in their Navy in terms of numbers of vessels or in capabilities of their vessels. We do not plan to match them.

We just hope that as a result of future negotiations what you would have is great predictability between the two sides vis-a-vis the navies, and that is probably a very fair thing to do because in the other weapons systems we really are talking about some very major cuts.

We cannot very well leave unverified or uncontrolled any one type of weapons system or type of armed forces among others. When you start negotiations, the negotiators for each side naturally sit down and they defend the interests of their own side at the negotiation. And without the good will of both sides nothing will be able to be achieved at any of these negotiations.

That is what we proceed from when we pose the question.

Senator **Kennedy**. Senator Cohen.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Marshal Akhromeyev, you may take as a small consolation that we subjected your friend Admiral Crowe to equally vigorous, far-ranging questions periodically when he appeared before the committee, and I just want you to know we are treating you a little bit softer than we treated him.

Marshal **Akhromeyev**. That does not bother me, Senator. But do not forget from my point of view, since I am a citizen of another country, I am not an American, and maybe I sounded a little harsh in some of the answers I gave because I do not depend upon the Senate of the United States. [Laughter.]

Senator **Cohen**. Actually, you are presenting a kinder, gentler military response to the questions that we ask here.

Now that we are talking about glasnost and a declaration of naval capabilities in the Soviet Union, let me ask you what is the rate of submarine production in the Soviet Union per year?

Marshal **Akhromeyev**. You know, I might make a mistake in giving you an answer. In this case, I promise to send you, when I get home, that number. But, reserving the right to excuse myself in advance for making a mistake, I will say 4–5 subs a year.

Senator **Cohen**. Is that diesel or nuclear? How does it break down?

Marshal **Akhromeyev**. No. Here I am talking about nuclear subs.

Senator **Cohen**. Four to five nuclear subs. What about diesel submarines?

Marshal **Akhromeyev**. I will send you the exact number when I get home.

[The information was not provided.]

Senator **Cohen**. Let me come back to the point about the United States having 20 aircraft carriers. Senator Warner has been hiding four additional aircraft carriers down in his State. But let me ask you. The Soviet Union, I believe, has two large aircraft carriers under construction. Is that not correct?

Marshal **Akhromeyev**. If you consider 70,000 tons to be large or enormous, then yes, we have two of them being constructed—if you consider that to be large.

U.S. aircraft carriers I think are 98,000 tons.

Senator **Cohen**. But the 70,000 are larger than anything the Soviet Union has presently.

You also, I believe, have smaller types of platforms that would accommodate helicopters, as you referred to Senator Nunn, that we have I think you counted three smaller ships that have helicopters on board or what we might call VSTOL—vertical takeoff and landing—capability. I believe the Soviet Union also has a number of those in its inventory, does it not?

Marshal **Akhromeyev**. We have got four of those.

Senator **Cohen**. So it is not quite accurate to say the United States has 20 and you have zero.

Marshal **Akhromeyev**. Excuse me. I am sorry. I said 15.

Senator **Cohen**. The statement says 20.

Let me ask you, Marshal, there is the thing called the Reykjavik counting rule, and I am told that you are the one who suggested or was largely responsible for giving an incentive to construct and deploy a penetrating bomber. For example, a B–2 bomber could be loaded with as many as 20 gravity bombs and yet be counted as one.

Mr. AFANASENKO. I am sorry, sir. I lost you there.

Senator COHEN. The counting rules for bombers. I believe that Marshal Akhromeyev is the one who recommended that we give a counting rule that would allow a B–2 bomber for the United States to carry 20 gravity bombs and yet it would only be counted as one under the counting rule. We call it the Akhromeyev rule. Is that correct?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. That is the first time I hear this Akhromeyev counting rule.

Senator COHEN. Well, we have given you credit for it. But could you tell me the rationale? Why would you want to give an incentive for the United States to deploy a penetrating bomber as opposed to, let us say, a standoff cruise missile-carrying aircraft that would be far from your borders? Why would the Soviet Union want to encourage or give an incentive by virtue of the counting rules to deploy a penetrating bomber as opposed to one that would not have a penetrating capability and could not penetrate Soviet air spaces?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. You see, when I made that proposal I never pursued any of those kinds of goals. In Reykjavik the problem arose how are we going to count bombers that are going to be armed with long-range ALCMs, in other words over a range of 600 kilometers, and bombers which are equipped with radar-guided bombs, say the SRAM-type missiles.

At first we proposed a counting rule as follows: that these types of bombers that are equipped with radar-guided bombs be counted as one delivery system and four weapons. The U.S. side did not agree to that proposal. We came to Reykjavik having very wide divergence in views.

We had to come up with a basis for some sort of a future treaty, and as a matter of meeting the U.S. halfway in response to some steps which we felt were very forthcoming, we came out with this, where we said if it is a SRAM we count it as one weapon or one warhead.

In turn, the United States then met us halfway and gave in on certain other positions, bringing the positions closer. That is essentially how that issue was approached and solved.

Senator COHEN. Let me ask you one final question. Marshal, you have proposed that we ban nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and nuclear cruise missiles that are assigned to naval aviation. The problem I have is that you also have aircraft that are assigned to the Soviet air force which train for naval missions. What I have in mind specifically is the Backfire bomber, which has a nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile. It also is being fitted, according to my understanding, with a new missile, what we call the AS–16.

The question I have is how would you propose banning nuclear weapons at sea, how would that ban be effective when your air force retains an inherent naval attack capability?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Senator, you see I have already said that becomes one of the subjects for the negotiations. Prior to entering into negotiations, we carry out a lot of work in terms of setting up the framework and circumscribing those subjects that are going to be part and parcel of the negotiations.

If we were to sit down at the negotiating table, each side would lay out its issues onto the negotiating table, and these issues would begin to get solved. Right now, we could lay out so many issues on the table that it would be impossible to answer them all.

Senator COHEN. Then the question I have is why would we want to lay out all of these issues prior to a START I Treaty being signed and instead go forward with a START I leaving these issues for a follow-on to START II. If there are so many issues to be resolved, if speed is of the essence here and timing is important that we have a treaty under way so we keep the process going, in concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully suggest that it would be far more important to go forward and resolve and conclude START I and leave the very complex negotiating issues that remain on sea-launched cruise missiles for the follow-on negotiations.

Otherwise, this will be delayed well into next year, with no conclusion of a START Treaty. I hope that you will consider that, respectfully, Marshal.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Here today we are not discussing with you slowing down the process of preparing a START Treaty. On that issue, thank God we are moving pretty well and we are almost finished. But we are carrying on negotiations with the United States on reduction of strategic offensive arms for, my God, 21 years now. I mean, 21 years is such a long period of time that one would think we might have approached a discussion of reducing naval forces by now.

Senator COHEN. I take it, then, that as far as resolving the SLCM issue, that is not going to hold up the conclusion of the START I negotiations or the conclusion of the START I Treaty.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. But, do not forget, SLCMs and ALCMs are precisely one of the subjects and topics of negotiation of the START Treaty. That is really the essence of the START Treaty right now. These issues have to be solved prior to being able to sign that treaty.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Just one follow-up on Senator Cohen's question as to what kind of agreement you are looking for with respect to the sea-launched cruise missiles. After the meeting that took place in February 1990 there was a joint statement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Baker. In that joint statement the following quote appears: The sides agree that such missiles would be dealt with by parallel politically-binding declarations for the duration of the START Treaty.

It is now my understanding that what the Soviet Union has asked for in April, as opposed to February, was a legally-binding ceiling on SLCMs and also effective verification procedures. Could you clarify which of those views is now the Soviet position?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. I can explain. In December 1987, here in Washington, in a joint statement by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev, which is the foundation for the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms, it was written that the sides take upon themselves the obligation to set an upper limit on long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, and the limits to be set by the two of them.

We never denied that or walked away from that. But during the negotiations the U.S. side proposed that we formalize this obligation by coming up with a politically-binding declaration on the two sides which would be an addendum to the treaty.

We agreed to that, and in February in Moscow we confirmed that. And even now we are still prepared to confirm that in the form of a politically-binding declaration, but that the limit be established, the upper limit, on the deployment of SLCMs.

If one were not to do that, then by building SLCMs you could bypass the treaty, you could walk around the treaty, having deployed then several thousand additional SLCMs and the treaty becomes nonsensical. That is the position that we maintain now and that is the position that we had in February.

Senator NUNN. One final question, Marshal. Would you describe for us the general outlook and morale of Soviet military forces today, with all the changes taking place in the Soviet Union—the morale and general outlook of the Soviet military today, particularly considering the changes taking place in the Soviet Union economically as well as nationality challenges.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. First of all, I would say that as far as the average soldier or the junior officer is concerned, the first and foremost thing is that they are people who understand their duty and their obligations before their mother country—that they have taken the oath to defend and protect their Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

At the same time, they do understand that the country is now experiencing a very difficult period in perestroika, which basically affects the whole life of all the people of the country. This generated difficulties and, I might add, quite large difficulties within the minds of the people serving in the military in our country.

It affected the life and fate of every officer and members of his family. What is more important is in the past, if an officer sort of took life as it came and suffered the deficiencies that he might have had in his life, understanding that a country cannot solve all issues right away, now, when you have glasnost currently in the country and everybody speaks out very directly, so that same officer now wants to speak out, to speak very directly and tell people what he thinks.

He talks about difficulties in his material life. The basic mass of the population, officers, soldiers, the overwhelming majority are people who serve and carry out their duties the way it has been prescribed to them. So the army, therefore, our army, remains very militarily and combat-capable and ready. That difficulty of the frictions that we have and the sharpening frictions in the nationality issues, it makes life difficult when you try to maintain combat effectiveness and readiness in the armed forces. Nonetheless, that kind of combat readiness is being maintained.

And the last thing I would like to say is that our armed forces always support our government, our country, support its president, not as an individual person but as head of state. And in this sense this support becomes a guarantee of our constitutional regime and very strongly protects and defends our country against any kinds of surprises or uncertainties.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. We appreciate your being here with us and hope you have a safe trip home.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Marshal, your testimony this morning has been a very helpful insight into issues which are of enormous importance to this country, and I am delighted that you were able to make it, even though you and I have a difference of view on the achievability of agreements in naval arms control.

I want to go back to your testimony before the House of Representatives in July 1989 and then again your statement submitted to the committee today, in which you have been consistent in stating that the beginning of Soviet-American negotiations on naval cuts is a "precondition for the improvement of relationships between our countries", and that is consistent in both statements.

Is that your personal view or is that the view held by Mr. Gorbachev and other senior Soviet officials?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. We feel that if you are going to have negotiations you have to build up some confidence and trust in the other side. Of course the basis for that is verification, so that both sides will be able to prove and check and be convinced that the other side is fulfilling its obligations under the agreement.

But if relations between the two states are ruined and harmed and they start getting into confrontations with each other, as happened in the past between our two countries, then the very accords or the signing of any kinds of accords would then be impossible anyway.

So the improvement in relations and trust is really a precondition for us to get into negotiations. But alongside that there has to be trust.

Senator WARNER. Well, Marshal, let me try and restate my question. Your testimony, consistent now for a year, has been that the institution—that is, the beginning—of discussions on naval arms control is "a prerequisite for further improvement of Soviet-American relations."

What did you mean that it is a "prerequisite"? If we fail to institute a series of arms control negotiations tantamount to START and CFE that we will see a deterioration in these relationships? I am trying to establish the priority that you attach to naval arms control and whether that is your view or a view held by Mr. Gorbachev and other leaders of the Soviet Union.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. You see, when we started perestroika in 1985, Senator, everything was tied in together—strategic offensive arms, land forces in Europe, and naval forces. And we said at that time negotiations have to start on all these areas simultaneously—and nothing worked.

We then decided to cut the Gordian knot to begin negotiations on strategics[sic] first, conventional forces in Europe next, and right now to set aside the naval talks. So even way back then we broke that linkage. But you cannot do this forever.

Let us say we sign with you the 50 percent cuts in strategic offensive arms, and then we sign an agreement on conventional forces in Europe, doing nothing for the moment on naval forces. What are we going to do then? Then we have to, what, go forward on strategics[sic] again. We have to go forward and have additional cuts on conventional forces in Europe then. And, what, then you are going to continue refusing to do anything about talking on naval forces?

People, our Soviet people, ask me: You are a marshal. You know something about military affairs, right? Then explain to us what is the United States doing. Why are they refusing to enter into negotiations on naval forces? Allow me to ask you, what am I supposed to tell these people? No matter how knowledgeable I might be in military affairs, I have got nothing to tell them.

And the Soviet people begin to have suspicions and mistrust toward the policies of the United States because they refuse to enter into negotiations on naval forces. That is where the connection is, because now all the people are tied into this now.

Senator WARNER. Let me summarize what I understand you to be saying—that upon the satisfactory completion of a START agreement and a CFE agreement, that further talks in either of these areas toward a START II or CFE-II there is a clear precondition that naval arms control must be a third forum initiated. Is that correct and is that view held by Mr. Gorbachev?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. You have just said that 100 percent right. That is precisely what we are seeking.

Senator WARNER. And does that represent the view of General Secretary and President Gorbachev and other leaders of the Soviet Union?

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. In this given case I am appearing before you as an individual, as a person, and I am telling you what my personal opinion is. Nobody authorized me to come here. The only person who invited me here was Senator Kennedy, so I came here, and I am just telling you my position.

Senator WARNER. However, in the testimony before the House, the statement was "we", "we regard reaching agreement on starting the talks to reduce our naval forces and limit military activities at sea to be a major prerequisite." Now I assume that you selected "we" to represent persons in addition to yourself; am I correct? Why the use of the word "we" when you testified before the House? That implies that there are others besides the Marshal.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Yes. Sure. I have got millions of people standing behind me and supporting me and who think the way I do.

Senator WARNER. Can I then——

Senator KENNEDY. Senator, I apologize for interrupting. We are going to have a series of votes that are going to start at just about noontime and I would like to make sure Senator Wirth gets some time.

Senator WARNER. I have been given adequate opportunity.

Senator KENNEDY. If you would like to have a final question that will be fine.

Senator WARNER. A final question, then. Marshal, in many of the proposals made by the Soviet Union on limiting tactical nuclear weapons at sea or the sea-launched cruise missiles on ships, your country asserted that intrusive on-site inspection would be acceptable. Yet in negotiations on open skies it is the Soviet Government that has refused to open all of its territory to overflights.

Now I find it inconsistent that you would have intrusive means of verification and inspection at sea yet deny a comparable and yet equally important intrusive inspection in terms of overflights.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Senator, do not forget that the open skies negotiations only just began 3 months ago in February, and it is a little early to start drawing conclusions from the open skies negotiations. I am saying that American inspectors come to look at land-based ICBMs. They look and they see everything.

In INF also we have the right to look at—well, we have an INF. Now when we sign the ICBM missile deal, they will be able to go see the ICBMs. That is what I am asking. Why is it that we can look and inspect warheads on land-based missiles but you cannot do it on missiles or weapons that are at sea.

Senator WARNER. I thank the Marshal. Mr. Chairman, I yield.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Senator from Virginia for his courtesy.

Marshal, thank you for being here. Let me give you one partial answer to the question you are being asked by Soviet citizens on what America is doing.

We have reduced the number of ships from the goal of a 600-ship navy to fewer than 500. The number of carriers have dropped down to about 12. And were our Navy more politically sophisticated, they would engage in naval arms control rather than digging their heels in, as they do, and saying we cannot have any naval arms control.

Now I happen to agree with you that we ought to be discussing with the Soviets various naval issues and would suggest that there are two. One, I do not see how we are more threatening to you than we were in the 1970s. In the 1970s, we had about 475 naval vessels; we now have about 475, or will soon. We had 12 carriers then; we now have 12 carriers.

The area that is probably more threatening is the one that is illustrated on the chart up here, the number of tactical nuclear weapons in the Navy, and that is probably one area for very real discussion.

NAVAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

	BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS	SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES	TACTICAL WEAPONS BOMBS
ARSENALS			
US	5000	300	2200
USSR	3600	50-350	2700-3000
ARMS CONTROL	START (Limits would reduce both arsenals)	START SIDE AGREEMENT (Both sides declare SLCM deployments)	NO CONSTRAINTS

Your friend Admiral Crowe and former Ambassador Nitze have addressed this problem. I hope we get to that point of discussion of tactical nuclear weapons at sea.

The other area which I think is very promising is confidence-building measures, which you mentioned briefly at dinner last night. I will just close by asking you if you might want to discuss those very briefly in the limited time that we have.

When I was in the Soviet Union and saw you in January, I also spent time with Mr. Rogachev, the Deputy Foreign Minister for Asian Affairs, and we discussed obligatory notification of military exercises, mutual invitation of observers at exercises, military data exchange, discussions of naval doctrine, open skies, and the expansion of tripartite agreement between the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union—all as confidence-building measures in the context of naval arms control.

Perhaps you might want to mention what you would like to see as an opening start in terms of confidence-building measures, if in fact that is a useful way to begin.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. I thank you, Senator. I thank you for the help, and I will try and take your conclusions and some of your thoughts and use them in my talks with people back home. I tell you very frankly, I try to tell people back home that our relations with the United States are getting better and they are improving every day. I never tire in being a supporter of the improvement of relations between the two countries.

But the issue of naval forces becomes sharper and sharper every day as well. Of course, we tell our people we believe the time will come when those negotiations will begin, and if I sharpened my thoughts in my statement today in answering the questions, I did that only for you to understand how much we want that to happen and how serious an issue it is for us. That is why I was a little sharp in my responses.

This is not a capricious behavior by any one individual person but the whole country.

Senator KENNEDY. We have been joined by the chairman of the Budget Committee, Senator Sasser, who remembers his meetings with you in Moscow. We welcome him here and invite him to make any comment or any question in the brief time we have.

Senator SASSER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for inviting the Marshal here this morning and express to Marshal Akhromeyev my thanks for the hospitality and courtesies that he extended to myself and Senator Mitchell and some of our Senate colleagues at his headquarters in Moscow just a few weeks ago.

I am a visitor before this committee myself, Marshal, as are you, so my questions here will be brief and guided by the wishes of the chairman.

One general question that I would like to pose to you this morning. Some of my colleagues have indicated earlier, I am told, and it is the conventional view here in the United States that our Navy should not be viewed as posing a threat to the Soviet Union. After all, we have a long tradition here in the United States of maintaining a substantial naval force because we are a nation of commerce, and this naval force has been used, it is said, in a benign way to simply keep the lanes of commerce open.

I would be interested, Marshal Akhromeyev, in your views generally as to why you perceive the Navy to be a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV. Well, after all, our relations have improved, improved significantly. Nonetheless, we do present to each other a military threat. We have to say this candidly and everybody says that, including your President. He recently spoke and on the 20th of March called upon the issue of military strategy. I studied that document of the President's very carefully.

And if under these conditions we start talking, you and we, about reducing tensions in the field of the military and armed forces, we feel that to the same degree as other types of armed forces we should do the same thing on the naval side. We want nothing other than beginning negotiations.

You understand that when we have negotiations the United States would never allow the negotiators to do anything which would cause harm to the national interest of the United States. Nobody can force them to do anything other than what the United States wishes to do. But then people would see—your people, our people—that along the whole spectrum of various types of arms we have negotiations.

But when one of the sides over a period of many years refuses to talk on one or another item, that causes concerns to arise and those concerns are now growing. That is the whole issue.

Senator KENNEDY. I want to thank very much Senator Sasser for coming over and joining us here today. We want to thank our very capable translator, Peter Afanasenko, who has done yeoman service here this morning. We thank you.

And we thank you, Marshal. I think a great deal has been said about the nature of the relationship between our two countries. I think anyone who has had the opportunity, as so many of our colleagues did today, to hear you on these issues and to be able to question both you and the policies of your government, has to recognize that we are light years ahead of where we were several years ago. We have differences, important differences, but I think substantial progress can be made in these areas of difference, certainly with the attitude you have expressed here this morning and at other times when there have been extremely important matters affecting the national security of your country and our country.

You have certainly acted in an enormously positive and constructive way. We thank you very much for joining us here today. We look forward to giving good thought to many of the things that you have said. We hope you will give some thought to some of those points that have been raised here, and we wish you a safe return to the Soviet Union.

The committee stands in recess.

Marshall AKHROMEYEV. Thank you, Senator, very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

APPROACHES TO NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1990

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PROJECTION FORCES,
AND REGIONAL DEFENSE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Kennedy and Cohen.

Committee staff members present: Daniel G. Sakura, research assistant.

Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, Creighton Greene, and Michael J. McCord.

Minority staff members present: Brian D. Dailey, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Elizabeth Ann Harlow, Lori M. Jackson, and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon, William J. Lynn and Christopher E. Paine, assistants to Senator Kennedy, Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn, Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby, James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen, Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain, Lee W. Whittaker, assistant to Senator Wallop, Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton, and Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, CHAIRMAN

Senator KENNEDY. We will come to order.

The Projection Forces Subcommittee is meeting today for its second hearing on an important but largely overlooked area of arms control, limits on naval forces. Earlier this week we heard testimony on the Soviet perspective of this issue from Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the Senior Arms Control Advisor to President Mikhail Gorbachev. Today we will hear the administration's views.

Three areas of naval arms control seem promising and offer important benefits to the United States. The first is the possibility of a ban on tactical nuclear weapons at sea, which would reduce the most dangerous threat to aircraft carriers that are the backbone of our surface fleet. It would also contribute to more stable U.S.-Soviet relations by reducing the possibility that a confrontation at sea could escalate to the nuclear level. In addition, such a ban would ease the frictions that the presence of nuclear weapons causes at our naval bases overseas. It would make a virtue of necessity since the Navy is now phasing out most types of tactical nuclear weapons.

The second area is the possibility of negotiating ceilings on nuclear attack and cruise missile submarines in order to reduce the undersea threat to both nations and allow reduced expenditures. Limits on submarines will reduce the Soviet threat to U.S. efforts to resupply Europe. This benefit will be of increasing significance as we negotiate troop reductions in Europe. It becomes even more dependent on our ability to return forces across the Atlantic to deter war.

Now, and for the foreseeable future, the Soviets have more submarines than the United States, but ours are more advanced. An equal limit on submarines would eliminate the Soviet numerical advantage without compromising our technological edge. At the same time the United States should reject Soviet efforts to link submarine reductions to cutbacks in our carrier fleets. Our carriers have important roles in low intensity conflicts not involving the Soviet Union, and bilateral negotiations with Moscow are not appropriate in light of these unrelated interests.

A third area for progress in naval arms control is to take further confidence-building steps to reduce the risk of accidental war at sea. Three such agreements are now in force and possible additional measures could include notification and observation of major exercises and a ban on threatening actions such as mock attacks on ports and ships.

Finally, in dealing with each of these three areas we must avoid measures that restrict freedom of the seas. Steps such as restrictions on naval activities and shipping lanes in international straits have little value in arms control. Current practices are not threatening to either side and should be conducted with the respect to international commerce and the rights of all nations.

The United States is first and foremost a maritime nation. Our security depends on the ability of our Navy to control the seas, to ensure freedom of trade in times of peace and the resupply of our allies in times of conflict. Appropriate naval arms control agreements will in no way jeopardize this vital U.S. interest.

We are very fortunate today to have three knowledgeable and experienced spokesmen for the U.S. Navy and the arms control position. I will introduce them in just a moment, but first would recognize Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to join you in extending a very warm welcome to our witnesses today. I remember when Mr. Lehman worked on the staff of the Armed Services Committee a long time ago, and I have enjoyed our relationship since that time. Admiral Trost, I understand this may be the last time you will be testifying before this subcommittee, but I expect that you will be coming before the committee later on concerning other matters. Mr. Hadley, I also want to welcome you.

On Tuesday, I think as we are all aware, Marshal Akhromeyev testified before the subcommittee. I think it was certainly an interesting and unprecedented experience. We had occasion at that time, I think, to either quote or paraphrase Bismark that there were two things that remained unchangeable in this world of constant flux: One was history and the other was geography.

And the enduring geographical fact is that we are an island nation, remain so and will continue to remain an island nation dependent upon the seas and upon the sea lines of communication for our prosperity and survival. The Soviet Union, by contrast, is a continental power and largely self-sufficient and not dependent upon the sea lines of communication, but upon railways, roads, inland waterways for commerce and transport to its allies. I think this fundamental asymmetry cannot be overlooked or, indeed, minimized in any discussion on naval forces.

And I think it is worth nothing that the arms control agenda is already full, if not overloaded. I think it is appropriate that both the United States and Soviet officials ought to be considering what additional steps can be taken independently or indeed cooperatively to reduce international tensions and risk of conflict. At the same time, I think we have to note that the arms control agenda before both of our countries, as I indicated, is quite complete at this time.

Marshal Akhromeyev indicated that without an agreement upon sea launch cruise missiles there would be no START Treaty. I hope this is not the position taken by the Soviet Union. Marshal Akhromeyev said he was speaking as an individual, not on behalf of the Soviet Union, but one suspects that perhaps he has been given some instructions or at least is not acting totally independently from his superiors in the Soviet Union. But I hope that is not the position of the Soviet Union as was indicated during our hearings.

This is an incredibly complex area. There are innumerable tradeoffs that would have to be achieved, not only dealing with verification measures which are completed and may be intrusive, but also in terms of what kind of tradeoffs would have to be achieved with bomber capability on the part of the Soviet Union with their Backfires which are really targeted against our fleet. What sort of restrictions, not only in numbers, but in capability, are there in the Backfire and other type of aircraft? So I think this is a very, very complex area.

We ought to, in my judgment, adhere to the principal declaration with regard to the sea launch cruise missiles which was included in the joint statement of the Moscow ministerial in February. I think it is sound. We ought to adhere to it and not back away as we are reaching toward the summit meeting coming later this month. So I hope Marshal Akhromeyev's position is not that of the Soviet Union, but rather that we should seek to conclude a START Treaty as quickly as possible and then we serve the resolution of these complex, highly interwoven tradeoffs that will have to occur with respect to sea launch cruise missiles.

I think that we can achieve reductions or indeed perhaps even eliminations of long-range nuclear tipped sea launch cruise missiles, but that is going to take a lot of hard negotiation. It is not going to come about in the next 2 or 3 weeks, and I would far prefer to see us arrive at a START Treaty with follow-on negotiations dealing with sea launch cruise missiles than to forfeit the treaty itself.

Finally, let me say that I support the proposal offered by Senator Kennedy and others that the Soviets share more information with the United States regarding their plans for acquiring military equipment. I think such action will go a long way toward reducing the sense of skepticism or, indeed, lack of confidence in current structures.

So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you very much. We have Ambassador Ron Lehman, who is Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He is a familiar figure to the committee, having served the committee for a number of years, and now he has very special responsibilities. We are glad to have him. We have Admiral Trost, who is the Chief of Naval Operations, and Stephen Hadley, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

All of our witnesses have made very considerable efforts to be with us and accommodate the schedule of the subcommittee. We did want to have this hearing in as close proximity as possible with the hearings we had earlier in the week, so we could have the full story and a balanced picture with the testimony that we will hear today. They all made considerable efforts to join with us, and we are very grateful to them.

Mr. Lehman, would you be good enough to start off, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II, DIRECTOR U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Ambassador **Lehman**. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cohen, we are very pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. approach to naval arms control. I have a rather lengthy statement, and if you wish I can simply submit that for the record and make a few opening comments.

Senator **Kennedy**. Please. We will include all of your statements as if read, and the witnesses can make their presentations as they so desire.

INTRODUCTION

Ambassador **Lehman**. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to accompany the CNO and Assistant Secretary Hadley. Not only are they good friends, but they are among the finest colleagues one could wish for in working in the arms control area. We have spent many long hours together, and they have been extremely helpful. So, even though each of our agencies and departments in the military services may have a slightly different legislative and institutional mandate and, therefore, our perspectives might be somewhat different, we all three are guided by a common interest in the security of the United States and its allies and friends overseas and in global stability and security.

Let me focus on the arms control dimension, but I should say that you will find that whatever our differences on perspective, we come to the same conclusions as to what our agenda should be in the area of naval arms control. Senator Cohen I think correctly pointed out that our arms control agenda is very broad. It is broad, we believe, because we have had a sound strategy in approaching each set of negotiations. The plate is very full. I will not say that we are unprepared to put more food on the plate. What I will tell you is that before we do, it ought to be food that is good for us.

With respect to the issue of naval arms control, most of what the Soviet Union has proposed that is new—and most of it is really not that new—is not particularly useful. Most of the items of naval arms control that are useful by and large have already been incorporated either into existing agreements already being implemented or are already a part of this very ambitious agenda that we already have underway.

Let me highlight some of that. I think that the public has focused on many of the great successes in arms control in recent years such as the INF Treaty and the Stockholm Agreement, which deals with the problem of ground forces that can conduct offensive operations and occupy territory. We have had a lot of interest in the nuclear risk reduction center and in our military-to-military contacts. Many of these things have attracted attention. What has been lost is that there is a long history of dealing with the oceans, the seas, and naval matters.

We have the Seabeds Treaty, we have the Incidents At Sea Agreement; we have in the negotiations underway many provisions addressing naval issues. This administration alone in the last 15 months has dealt with a number of important agreements, preventing dangerous military activities. We reached an agreement with the Soviet Union on innocent transit in territorial waters.

We have a number of verification and stability measures, including inspections of the warheads on submarine launched ballistic missiles, where agreements have been reached. We have basically continued to look at these issues where they would be useful.

But let me comment on some of the big items that are coming up. For example in the START Treaty, we are talking about a constraint on ballistic missile warheads that will put limits on submarine launched ballistic missile warheads under an overall ceiling of 4,900 on both land-based and sea-based missiles.

We have provisions in the START Treaty that prevent the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor, on seabeds or on tethers. Because of the Soviet Union's emphasis on sea-launched cruise missiles, we have agreed to a declaratory approach to sea-launched cruise missiles which we think can be negotiated in parallel with the START Treaty.

The Soviet Union has said that this is a precondition for them. It is not a precondition for us, but nevertheless we have gone at least halfway or more to try to address their concerns in a rational way that meets our interests. Our problem by and large with the Soviet proposals is that they do not take into account global realities. They do not take into account geography. By and large they tend to be one-sided.

You mentioned Marshal Akhromeyev and his testimony. I have spent many long hours, some pleasant, some involving very hard, difficult work with Marshal Akhromeyev. Senator Cohen, when I speak to him, he is usually speaking on behalf of the Soviet Government.

Let me say when we were in the Soviet Union with Defense Secretary Carlucci, we were presented with the famous map many of you have seen, which the Soviet Union uses to show American military presence, including our naval presence, around their periphery; and they say, "See, you surround us." I always tried to point out, "No, look at it from the other perspective. Look at all of our vital interests, allies and friends who are within easy striking distance of a vast panoply of Soviet forces, many of which are not covered by any agreements, and those are not the only security concerns that drive us toward having a strong navy, because you have to consider all of the rest of the world that is not on your map."

So we do have differences with the Soviet Union. Our approach to naval issues is not simply to say no. We have been willing and have negotiated many agreements when it was in our interest and in the interest of our allies, but we do not see great merit in any of the recent proposals that the Soviet Union has made, and we have been very candid in telling them so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lehman follows:]

STATEMENT BY

AMBASSADOR RONALD F. LEHMAN II

DIRECTOR

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. Chairman,

As a result of successful U.S. and Alliance policies, as well as dramatic changes within Warsaw Pact countries, the post-war threat posed by the Soviet Union to the security of the United States and its friends and allies is beginning a remarkable transformation. The impact of the alteration in the European political landscape has important implications across the spectrum of U.S. national security policies and programs. As a consequence, we are continuously assessing the changing security environment and where necessary, we have been readjusting our policy and strategy, recognizing as they emerge opportunities to enhance the security of the United States, its allies, and to strengthen international stability. Our arms control endeavors are a central component of our strategy and play an important role in our initiatives to promote stability and positive political change. At the same time, we have been careful not to let the changes taking place obscure fundamental realities such as simple facts of geography and the still massive Soviet nuclear and conventional arsenal, which ensure that the Soviet Union will retain a formidable military capability for the foreseeable future.

Political change in the Soviet Union and the increased openness accompanying it has had a particularly positive impact on the prospects of concluding effective and verifiable arms control agreements. While some have argued that the Soviet Union's domestic economic turmoil, combined with the current transformation of the Warsaw Pact, will inevitably lead to unilateral force withdrawals and reductions on both sides even without formal agreements, arms control is the best way to ensure that reductions take place in a predictable, verifiable, and irreversible manner. Current circumstances in fact offer an important opportunity to encourage positive changes and to codify and verify force reductions in areas which further our security.

In recognition of the opportunities at hand, the Bush Administration in a short fifteen months has not only renewed and intensified the pace of arms control negotiations, but has also broadened the arms control agenda substantially. At this moment, we have more elements of Soviet military capability under negotiation for constraint, reduction or ultimate elimination than at any other time in our history. Due to the President's vision and initiative, it is possible that several treaties may be ready for presentation to the Senate for its advice and consent in the coming months. At the present time, we are seeking agreements which, when successfully concluded, will:

-- redress the imbalance in conventional land forces in Europe;

-- enhance strategic stability at significantly reduced equal levels of strategic nuclear forces;

-- establish effective verification procedures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty;

-- lead to an effective, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons;

-- promote openness and predictability regarding military activities.

These are only highlights from a more extensive list of initiatives, but as you can see, the current arms control agenda is quite full and continues to grow.

As we step up to the threshold of so many far-reaching arms control agreements, the Soviet Union has begun to pressure us to extend arms control to include operational constraints on and reductions in U.S. naval forces far beyond that already agreed. Some here in the United States argue that the requirement for greater fiscal austerity demands that more arms control limitations and reductions be applied to the Navy, which accounts for a large share of our defense budget. The Soviet Union contends that the global American maritime presence is destabilizing and has proposed in virtually every negotiating arena that American naval assets and activities of many types not now covered be subject to reductions or operational constraints.

In every case where the United States is engaged in an arms control negotiation, the principal goals of our efforts are to reduce the risk of war - nuclear and conventional - deter aggression, and increase stability. Our efforts and proposals to date are guided by stringent criteria which assess the contribution and impact of each proposed measure on United States' national security, on the security of our allies and our U.S. strategic interests, in terms of three basic criteria:

-- Will deterrence be enhanced or strengthened?

-- Will stability in the strategic and regional balances be enhanced?

-- Will an agreement be confidently and effectively verifiable?

Although we are optimistic about the possibilities of a new, cooperative era in U.S.-Soviet relations, our arms control efforts -- if they are to serve the security of the United States and its allies and help to promote enduring peace -- must continue to meet the same exacting standards that we have applied to date and proceed from a realistic assessment of U.S. security and interests.

It may seem a paradox that the goals of security, stability and deterrence are often best served on land -- but not on the seas -- by arms control agreements which operationally constrain and reduce forces. Nevertheless, while it is the ability to take and hold territory that has always made land forces the central security concerns on the Eurasian land mass, it has been the United States' Navy's unfettered use of freedom of the seas which has so often enhanced both strategic and regional deterrence and stability. It is frequently an American naval presence which helps prevent regional conflicts affecting allies and friends from erupting, and it has increasingly been U.S. naval forces which have been ensuring the survivability -- and thus, the credibility -- of much of our strategic deterrent.

Contrary to Soviet assertions, normal naval operations and exercises are neither inherently destabilizing nor threatening. When used in support of diplomatic efforts, naval forces allow the United States to provide unambiguous yet measured crisis responses ranging from simple presence to the threat or application of force. In the more than 240 instances since 1945 requiring a crisis response from the United States, naval forces have been the political or military instrument of choice in more than 200. In fewer than 20 cases has this show of force escalated to combat. Moreover, in many of these cases, U.S. naval forces were called on to react to Third World crises in which Soviet involvement was tangential or non-existent.

Naval assets play multiple roles in defense of United States' interests worldwide These roles are shaped by geography and far-flung security, alliance and economic interests. These global maritime responsibilities mean that the Navy's role cannot be viewed in either a narrow U.S.-Soviet bilateral context, or a simple regional context, and therefore make it singularly unsuited for many otherwise potentially useful arms control measures.

Immutable geographic realities mean that global security requirements will continue to exist despite the political changes that may take place in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is and will remain the greatest power on the Eurasian land mass. Nor will major reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe change the fact that the Soviet Union will retain the largest military capability in Europe, within close striking distance of our allies and vital interests. Moreover, we should not overlook the stark reality that the political transformation of Warsaw Pact countries poses considerable uncertainty and risk as well as promise for freedom and democracy.

The United States, by contrast, is an ocean away from both its European and Asian allies. In the future, U.S. policy may also have to take into account the fact that the departure of U.S. forces from overseas bases -- whether in Europe or in Asia -- will mean that the U.S. ground presence as part of the military balance will be diminished. At the same time, our allies will continue to depend on us to meet our commitments to their security. Under these conditions, the U.S. force projection capability, of which the Navy is the mainstay, would be even more vital than it is today.

Freedom of the seas, flexible operations, power projection, and reinforcement have long been vital to the very existence of NATO and a foundation of U.S. military strategy. The sea lines of communication of the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Norwegian, Baltic, and North and Black Seas, are the lifelines of the Alliance.

In Asia, where the security threats are primarily regional, U.S. naval presence is often the critical deterrent to conflict. Even should the Soviet threat diminish significantly and conclusively, the United States and its allies face a growing naval threat in the Third World as regional powers acquire more sophisticated weapons systems. In an environment where proliferation -- of nuclear and chemical weapons as well as ballistic and cruise missiles -- threatens, for example, in Libya and North Korea, the role of U.S. naval forces is quite significant. For these reasons, it is essential then that we maintain a navy that can carry out all its missions, including the protection of vital sea lanes of communication globally, unencumbered by artificial operational constraints.

In contrast, the Soviet Union enjoys the geographic advantage of secure internal lines of communication making it far less dependent on the seas for its security or economic livelihood. In a sense, our maritime dependency is somewhat analogous to Soviet dependence on internal transportation systems. By the same token, it is the geographical asymmetry between East and West which drives the asymmetry between U.S. and Soviet naval force postures and interests. Therefore, the Soviet

Union is now pressing for concessions from the U.S. that would come at the disproportionate expense of the security of the United States and its allies and friends. In fact, since the early 1980's the Soviet Union has proposed a number of measures to prohibit and constraint peacetime operations, both globally and in nearly every specific geographic region covering Murmansk, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the western and northern Atlantic and the Pacific.

The United States has consistently opposed such measures because in each case they would have a deleterious effect on U.S. security, and would neither meet the standards of enhancing deterrence, stability, nor of being effectively verifiable. Many forms of codified predictability and transparency measures which we seek so assiduously in arms control affecting land-based forces, do not apply in the same way at sea and thus often do not serve the goals of deterrence and stability. The activities of slow-moving surface ships are already basically transparent. Moreover, naval forces are incapable of taking and occupying territory, which is the threat most transparency measures attempt to mitigate. Measures such as notifications which are designed to constrain or to telegraph in advance naval ship movements could make our ships more vulnerable, thus ultimately eroding, rather than enhancing deterrence and stability.

Thus, the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union often impose unacceptable conditions or absolute prohibitions on rights of access or free use of the high seas that all nations currently possess at a time when the United States and its allies are pressing to expand many similar rights of free movement to the land and skies.

The United States' policy that free access to certain areas is to be encouraged rather than constrained is not simply limited to maritime issues. This philosophy is reflected in President Bush's proposal for an "Open Skies" regime. This proposal would establish a regime allowing nations peaceful access, consistent with air safety considerations, to each others' national airspace for purposes of observation, in order to increase confidence, complement verification of arms control arrangements, and reduce security concerns. In a separate but somewhat analogous proposal, the United States has suggested to the Soviet Union undertaking reciprocal steps to reduce and remove travel restrictions on academics, journalists, and diplomatic personnel, a concept we have called "Open Lands." However, what differentiates the oceans and outer space from Open Skies and Open Lands is that international access to the seas and space is already a matter of international practice and law.

United States opposition to Soviet naval arms control proposals which impinge on our rights of free passage on the high seas does not mean that we have been, or are, unwilling to consider measures that would regulate these rights to solve concrete and specific security problems. In fact, the United States is party to a variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements which affect naval forces. In each case, however, their intent is to preserve accessibility. One example is the 1971 "Accident Measures" Agreement which deals with incidents involving nuclear weapons including those at sea. We have also concluded the "Incidents at Sea" Agreement of 1972 which established a viable and continuing regime for regulating U.S. and Soviet naval activities that could pose the risk of conflict. In 1988, we concluded agreements with the Soviet Union which require each side to provide advance notification of all strategic ballistic missile launches, that is, launches of all missiles which travel through space, whether launched from land or sea.

The Stockholm Agreement of 1986 establishes prior notification and observation of amphibious operations since such activities are functionally linked to notifiable ground exercises and falls under the Madrid Mandate. In 1989, we agreed with the Soviet Union on our respective rights of innocent naval passage through territorial waters. In addition, our two senior military leaders signed the "Dangerous Military Activities Agreement' which obligates the sides, among other things, to resolve incidents arising from such activities without the threat or use of force. As you know, 1989 was also witness to an exchange of port visits by U.S. and Soviet navies in an historic effort to establish military contacts. Senior Soviet military officers have been invited aboard U.S. Navy combat vessels and I, and other U.S. officials have been on board Soviet Navy combat vessels.

In addition, there are measures currently under discussion which are supported by the United States. In Vienna, we would support continued discussions regarding confidence-building measures that fall within the scope and application of the Madrid Mandate. Within the strategic context, the START Treaty, now nearing completion, would limit and reduces existing strategic arms~~,~~ including submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Outside the START Treaty itself, the U.S. has proposed that there will be declaratory U.S. and Soviet statements covering sea-launched cruise missiles.

Mr. Chairman,

The Bush Administration's arms control agenda is both broad and substantial. With skill, patience and continued hard work, we may be able to conclude a number of far-reaching agreements in the near-term. The issue of naval arms control is a subject that has been given careful consideration. Where we have identified specific security problems that can be addressed by developing measures regulating conduct on the high seas, we have made proposals or worked on the basis of the proposals of others. As the litany above demonstrates, several such instances have been found. In each case, the intent of these measures has been to preserve freedom of the seas. By contrast, current Soviet proposals which are designed to impede and limit that freedom and to enhance Soviet power at the expense of the security of others do not provide the basis for useful negotiations. The security and interests of the United States and its friends and allies overseas, international stability, our non-proliferation objectives, and deterrence, both global and regional must all be usefully weighed when we consider each new arms control possibility. I believe we have been making the right decisions.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. Admiral Trost.

STATEMENT OF ADM. CARLISLE A.H. TROST, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral TROST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very happy this morning to be before the committee to discuss this subject of naval arms control, an issue which has been misrepresented and misunderstood in the past. I appreciate the opportunity to submit the prepared statement for the record because it provides a detailed explanation of our rationale on naval arms control and the rationale that supports the position that has been taken by the Navy.

I would like, this morning, to provide brief remarks which reflect my perspective as the military officer, charged by law and directive, with the responsibility to ensure that our Navy is capable of continuing to gain and maintain naval supremacy and that it has a continuing capability to control vital sea lanes and protect them when and where needed as we conduct our operations at sea.

As I noted, my prepared statement provides a detailed explanation of the rationale that underlies our position. In these remarks, I would like to address some of the most important points regarding the four topics that you address in your letter inviting us to this hearing, those topics being nuclear weapons at sea, confidence and security-building measures, the proposal to restrict operations and exercises of naval forces on the high seas, and limits on ships and submarine force levels.

I guess I, too, should tell you that, like Ron Lehman, I have had an opportunity on several occasions to meet with and have discussions with Marshal Akhromeyev. So that you know where I stand with him, in the first of those sessions when he met with the Joint Chiefs I found myself, after the presentation of the chart which Ambassador Lehman has referred to, being the focus of his finger when he jabbed it at me and said, "you are the problem, you, the Navy." So I take that as underlying most of the remarks that he has made and will continue to make.

Senator COHEN. Of course, the subcommittee has often said that as well. [Laughter.]

Admiral TROST. I will accept that, also. I would submit, however, that before we undertake any dialogue on arms control, we do need to ensure that we know the purpose and that it is clearly stated and understood. The goal of arms control agendas must be to improve the security posture of each of the participants, and those goals must serve to increase global and/or regional stability. Other considerations such as reduced expenditures and smaller force levels should be byproducts of meaningful agreements and accords, not the purpose thereof.

Much of the context of naval arms control that is the focus of attention today, and has been addressed in numerous proposals by Soviet leaders, does not meet the simple but essential criteria. Too often, very significant differences in geography, discreet national security needs, economic factors and fundamental differences in interpretation of international law are being overlooked or being ignored.

In responding to your specific agenda items, I will begin with nuclear weapons at sea. Submarine launched ballistic missiles, our Trident and Poseidon forces, as noted by Ambassador Lehman, are already an integral component of the strategic arms reduction talks taking place. Our building program for submarines and missiles provides adequate flexibility to comply with current negotiating positions of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Additionally, these forces will be capable of reacting to unforeseen changes in U.S. strategic deterrent requirements in the years and decades ahead.

The more contentious aspect of nuclear weapons at sea is tactical weapons and, in particular sea launched cruise missiles. A clear understanding of why the U.S. Navy developed and deployed these weapons is central to our debate. Until we deployed the Tomahawk missile system on submarines and surface combatants beginning in the mid 1980s, our sea-based strike capability consisted fundamentally of aircraft carriers and their embarked aircraft.

Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the Soviet Union built a blue water navy and a blue sky naval air force whose capabilities focused on anticarrier warfare. Soviet submarines, their surface ships and land-based bombers were equipped with short and medium range antiship cruise missiles, most of which are nuclear capable. Soviet tactics were designed to overwhelm our at-sea air defenses with sheer numbers of missiles all targeted on U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups.

U.S. deployment of land attack and antiship cruise missiles on our surface ships and submarines has had the effect of dispersing

U.S. strike capability among many platforms. It has broadened options available to the national command authority and local commanders to respond to threats and to contingencies, and it has significantly reduced the potential vulnerability of our aircraft carriers by complicating any potential adversary's targeting problem.

Let me add that sea launched cruise missiles do not eliminate the need for carrier-based air strike capability. Rather, sea launched cruise missiles serve to complement that capability.

To date, with the exception of the personal views of Marshal Akhromeyev as expressed before this committee last Tuesday, Soviet proposals to place limits on sea launched cruise missiles have cleverly avoided the discussion of limiting or eliminating the serious threat posed by missile armed land-based Soviet navy bombers or short range missiles from their submarines and surface units. Their proposals specifically target the capability of Tomahawk and thereby seek to put the crosshairs back squarely on the deck of our aircraft carriers. I personally consider this situation completely unacceptable.

Restricting sea launched cruise missiles would also pose a substantial, if not impossible, obstacle to realistic verification. The only credible methods would involve unacceptably intrusive inspection of submarines and ships. There is also the added complication that the physical dimensions of these cruise missiles lend themselves to concealment either ashore or at sea aboard other ships, and they could be quickly available for breakout and deployment without prior detection.

It should be noted that this country has a flawless record of complying with treaty provisions even when it may not have been in our best interest. We can only speculate on similar confidence and compliance from current or future leaders in the Soviet Union.

I feel it should be stated, however, that the United States and our Navy have not been unresponsive for calls for discussions on sea launched cruise missiles. As noted, earlier this year in February, our officials and those of the Soviet Union agreed on provisions to enumerate types of platforms that could deploy with sea launched cruise missiles and to declare an overall number of missiles to be deployed. This position is mutually advantageous. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has since retreated from that agreement.

The issues of confidence and security-building measures and limits on naval operations and exercises are inherently related and, therefore, lend themselves to similar arguments and discussions. The majority of Soviet proposals vis-a-vis naval arms control dating back to the late 1950s, and under the guise of confidence-building measures, have focused on limiting free movement of naval forces in international waters. I view such proposals as attempts to abrogate time-proven principles of freedom of the sea for all nations.

Restricting naval forces from operating in areas of the Pacific, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean or other strategic waterways and shipping lanes which are proposed do not improve international stability. Moreover, such proposals clearly undermine specific U.S. security interests.

Some of these proposals have been tabled at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, in Vienna. These talks are governed by a mandate agreed to by all signatories including the Soviet Union which specifically states that naval forces and operations will not be discussed unless there is a direct functional link to military activities ashore such as in the case of a major amphibious operation.

There have been similar Soviet attempts to expand the scope of the CFE talks whose mandate again clearly states that naval forces will not be discussed at all. These efforts detract from what could otherwise be productive negotiations which should benefit all parties concerned.

Again, however, I would like to note that the United States has not been unresponsive in discussing meaningful confidence-building measures in other fora. For the past 18 years, U.S. and Soviet naval forces, when in close proximity, have operated under terms of the Incidents at Sea Agreement. Like previously mentioned proposals, INCSEA is mutually beneficial and significantly reduces the possibility of misunderstood intentions and most importantly does not infringe on freedom of the seas.

I would expect that U.S. and Soviet forces would realize similar benefits from the recently signed agreement on dangerous military activities, an agreement signed last year by Admiral Crowe and General Moiseyev and patterned, I might add, on the Navy's Incidents at Sea Agreement.

The last issue is force levels. Ongoing discussions of this issue appear to be driven more by fiscal considerations than anything else. That applies both to us and to the Soviet Union. In the last 2 years, our Navy has programmed and is executing early retirement of over 20 percent of our surface combatants, nearly 10 percent of our attack submarines and an aircraft carrier.

The Soviet navy is also retiring a number of their submarines and surface ships. There is a glaring difference, however, between the capability and the future utility of the units we are retiring and those of the Soviet Union. Our ships have been actively deploying up until the day of decommissioning. Soviet units are being raised from the bottom and loaded on barges, or are being towed away from piers where they have been moored for years prior to being sent to the scrap yards.

Finally, I feel any discussion to negotiate limits on ship numbers or types cannot discount the fundamental differences between the real mission and employment of our two navies. We in the United States have global overseas commitments and strong multilateral and bilateral cooperative agreements with our maritime allies. These agreements have effectively established a coalition of maritime nations that contributes to global and regional stability. The Soviet Union has no such mission or network of alliances; therefore, comparing forces with the intention of achieving quantitative parity is not meaningful and, from our perspective, is not in our best interest.

The bottom line is that our country is, as previously noted, a maritime nation, a sea power whose future is critically dependent on our free access to the seas and on regional stability in areas of U.S. economic and political interest. We ensure these with capable, ready, forward deployed naval forces, forces that can operate in international waters, uninhibited by unrealistic restrictions on movement. There really is no alternative if we are to remain a sea power.

History has shown that maritime nations have not fared well in naval arms control agreements. Our, and British, experiences in the Washington Naval Conference of the 1920s were nearly catastrophic. Although parties entered into negotiations with the best of intentions for improving security and stability, the resulting treaties did not account for the rapidly changing and uncertain international environment following World War I. I think we can reasonably characterize today's international security environment, while possibly less threatening in the short term, as similarly uncertain in the long term.

On several occasions, and as recently as 3 days ago when you received testimony from Marshal Akhromeyev, Soviet leaders have stated that the U.S. Navy is a serious threat to their security. History surely does not support that contention. No navy, as you have noted, regardless of strength will ever win a war in which occupying territory is the goal. A navy can only support a land campaign or prevent another nation from positioning itself to attack from the seas.

I contend that the U.S. Navy should only be viewed as a threat to Soviet security, if they indeed intend to mount a campaign against our allies in Europe and Asia, or intend to otherwise undermine legitimate U.S. and economic and political interests throughout the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Trost follows:]

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL C.A.H. TROST, USN
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Whatever else events in Eastern Europe, Nicaragua and, increasingly, in the Soviet Union may portend, they essentially signal the abandonment of Communism as an ideology and form of government, and the adoption of capitalism and democracy as the blueprint for the future. The euphoria experienced on both sides of the now defunct Iron Curtain because of this "victory" of democracy over communism has given rise to renewed emphasis on, and expectations from, arms control negotiations. It is important that, in the rush to celebrate this "victory," we do not abandon those forces which will be most important to our security in the newly emerging world order.

The United States, as a maritime nation, has always had a vital interest in maintaining free access to the oceans of the world. Increasingly, U.S. national security will be defined in economic terms. Our ability to maintain access to markets and critical resources overseas will determine whether or not we can maintain and improve our current quality of life. It is no accident that the system of alliances that brought us to our current political and economic position is defined in maritime terms - by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and agreements with our Pacific allies.

Our national concerns are global and the Navy's support of those concerns runs the gamut from goodwill visits to foreign ports, to securing access to the world's markets and strategic resources, to responding to regional crises, to providing the ultimate forces for nuclear and conventional deterrence. To meet this broad range of contingencies, we maintain naval forces capable of meeting our national security requirements. These naval forces provide the stability and deterrence that are necessary for continued U.S. political and economic viability.

A Maritime Nation Depends on Freedom of the Seas

Events in Eastern Europe have indeed placed renewed emphasis on arms control proposals which would reduce the level of forces on the European continent. This does not, however, mean that our security or the security of our allies would be enhanced by negotiated limits on naval forces, or, that the risk of war would be lessened through the imposition of constraints on the freedom of ships to operate on the high seas. In fact, such reductions or restrictions would undermine our security and stability and, in the long run, are counter to the goals of arms control. As a maritime nation dependent on sea-borne commerce and access to the world's markets, the United States cannot afford to limit through negotiations the very forces that are essential to protecting these interests -- its Navy.

The analogy is a bit worn, but nonetheless true. The seas are the roads and rail networks to our allies, to our resources and to our markets. The reductions in ground and land-based air forces currently addressed in the CFE negotiations do not require that the Soviets dismantle the highways and railroads which constitute their access to supplies of oil and other strategic resources, nor do they threaten the Soviet's ability to support their allies. Any restriction on America's free use of the seas would be asking us to do just that, and must be viewed as a significant restriction on our ability to remain a global power.

The U.S. Navy has always carefully considered every arms control proposal based on its merits, with the deciding factor being its contribution to the security of the United States and our allies. We continue to look for ways in which we can safely operate on the high seas with the navies of the world so that all can benefit from free access to the world's oceans. Those oceans are not, after all, just our highways and railroads.

There has been a lot of support both here and abroad for the "Open Skies" proposals and I share the belief that there is much to be gained by all parties in these arrangements. Open Skies proposals, in effect, take the concept of Freedom of the Seas into a different medium. Both Open Skies and Freedom of the Seas are models of openness - the ultimate confidence building measure. By assuring unfettered access to the oceans, the operating environment of all navies, all have the ability to observe - up close - another's forces, tactics and capabilities. Many of the confidence building measures proposed by the Soviets would, by constraining freedom of the seas, in fact lessen, rather than build, confidence in a nation's ability to monitor and evaluate another's capabilities and intentions.

Naval arms control proposals are not new. In fact, virtually all recent proposals have a long history, and some have actually been implemented. Over the years there have been restrictions on inventories of both platforms and weapons, on deployments into certain areas, on bases, on the employment of certain weapons, and on the conduct of maritime warfare. The lesson that we have learned is that such agreements only prevail as long as they serve the mutual benefit of all of the signatories, not just a single party. Those that have served us best are those that facilitate the openness and use of the seas and make them safer places to operate - not those that limit or restrict the use of the seas.

Unfortunately, the recent history of naval arms control does not commend itself to emulation. Twice in this century, coalitions of maritime nations have been caught unprepared, and were forced to go to war against continental powers who were able to interdict the sea lines of communications. The price of that unpreparedness, resulting in part from negotiated naval restrictions, was paid in blood.

Some Good Ideas

Long ago we recognized the need to maintain a cooperative, professional relationship with the other navies of the world - particularly the Soviet Navy. As a result, we established a regime for reducing tension and building confidence between our two navies. The Incidents at Sea Agreement between the Soviet and U.S. navies concluded in 1972, is a model of cooperation and has spawned a number of similar agreements among maritime nations. Without belaboring the point, this agreement has unquestionably created a safer, more stable, and more secure global environment by establishing guidelines for communicating during operations at sea and providing a mechanism for resolving differences. I know that Admiral Crowe and Marshall Akhromeyev had the success of the INCSEA agreements in mind when they concluded the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement last year.

In addition to preventing inadvertent conflict, one of our objectives is to enhance mutual trust and understanding. Again, the U.S. and Soviet navies have been at the forefront of the trend toward greater understanding and cooperation. As the first military service chief to visit the Soviet Union last October, I have established an active dialogue with the leadership of the Soviet Navy. In fact, I was privileged to address a large group of Soviet naval officers at the Leningrad Naval School on the subject of the U.S. Navy and our Maritime Strategy. My counterpart from the Soviet Union, Fleet Admiral Chernavin, is scheduled to visit the United States later this year. Recent and future planned port visits by ships of both navies have probably been the most widely publicized professional and cultural exchanges between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Less well known to the public is the active exchange of views in the professional journals of our two navies. We have also taken important initial steps towards establishing communications procedures between maritime patrol aircraft and Soviet ships in the Mediterranean.

These navy-to-navy efforts, along with our participation in the current START negotiations, the proposals for a declaratory policy on SLCM, our scrupulous adherence to the current requirements of the CDE, and our support of the Stockholm accords, define a U.S. Navy that has long been at work for the security and stability of this country. And, in the final analysis, security and stability are the issues - not "fairness" (as some observers would suggest). By this I mean that any proposal must, first and foremost, improve the security of the U.S. and its allies, reduce the risk of war, and improve global or regional stability. The proposals we have agreed to thus far meet these important tests.

Some Bad Ideas

Despite the impressive list of initiatives that we have already taken in the area of reducing tension, there are a number of proposals that I do not feel improve the security of the United States and its allies, reduce the risk of war, or improve global or regional stability.

Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM)

Perhaps the most contentious naval arms control issue is the

Soviet effort to place limits on our sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). These weapons were initially developed by the United States to meet the threat posed to our naval forces by the unprecedented Soviet Navy buildup over the past 20 years and their development of anti-carrier weapons and tactics.

I can appreciate the concern of Soviet planners. By evenly distributing SLCM's among a large number of ships and submarines, we seriously complicate their targeting. Instead of simply targeting our aircraft carriers, they must now worry about a larger number of launch platforms, dispersed throughout a very large ocean. Aside from the force multiplier effect that SLCMs give our Navy against the Soviets, they also make a larger number of naval platforms credible stand-off threats to any potential adversary. In a world increasingly defined by high-tech weaponry, the capability to bring precision strikes to bear from a distance will become increasingly important.

However, since nuclear SLCM is a theater-use weapon under the direct control of the unified CINCs, it is not, and should not be, included in any strategic weapons pact - such as START. At the December 1987 Washington Summit, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to seek a mutually acceptable solution to the issue of limiting this weapon system. In February of this year, Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to the concept of a declaratory policy (i.e., a politically binding statement) as a basis for involving SLCMs in arms control negotiations. Several issues remain unresolved concerning range and numbers of missiles and recently the Soviets began to back away from their earlier agreements. However, I feel that ours remains the correct approach to a difficult issue.

Verification remains one of the principal difficulties with

SLCMs. Since both the conventional and the nuclear versions of SLCM are identical in appearance, current verification technology would require that observers physically embark on our naval vessels to inspect the classified weapons stowage spaces. This type of intrusive inspection would involve an unacceptable level of interference with our ability to independently move our warships around the world. Additionally, for U.S. purposes, intrusive verification could only serve as a guarantee while the inspectors were aboard.

While Soviet proposals call for the declaration only of SLCMs with a range of 600 kilometers or greater by both sides, they are reluctant to include any of their own impressive inventory of operational ship-launched cruise missiles, the majority of which have ranges below the 600 kilometer threshold. Nor will these proposals address the significant imbalance posed by the existence of large numbers of nuclear anti-ship cruise missiles carried on Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft - all of which enable the Soviets to strike our forces at extended ranges and hazard our ability to control the sea when and where our interests require. These air-launched, anti-ship missiles pose as great a threat to our ships operating at sea as any weapon carried onboard Soviet ships and submarines.

It is definitely not in our interest to lose conventional SLCM as part of a bilateral agreement on strategic weaponry. Conventional SLCM's are tactical weapons that do not threaten strategic targets in the Soviet Union. Tomahawk Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (TASM) enable a commanding officer to defend his ship from long range against hostile naval surface forces. The conventional Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-C) is an extremely important and effective weapon in third world scenarios, against terrorists, or in situations where we would not want to risk a manned aircraft. These weapons, because of their non-nuclear capability, are critical elements of our non-strategic force structure, and enable us to support U.S. policy around the world.

Limits on Force Levels

The idea of negotiating ceilings or limitations on force levels appears to be a concept whose time has passed. Both the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy are unilaterally pursuing a fiscally imposed build-down of forces - but with an important difference. In the past year, we have retired one aircraft carrier, sixteen frigates and have scheduled the accelerated decommissioning of thirty-two guided missile destroyers. In FY-91 we have proposed the decommissioning of eight nuclear-powered submarines and two battleships. The FY-92 budget will probably see even more early retirements. These are front-line operational ships that are being retired early due to budgetary constraints. The Soviets are also scrapping ships at an accelerated rate. Their ships, however, are their "hangar queens," many of which have not been underway for years, some of which had actually sunk at their piers, and others that were so unseaworthy that they sank enroute to the scrapping yard.

We have also unilaterally decided to retire three of our nuclear weapons systems because they are obsolete. The ASROC, nuclear TERRIER, and SUBROC systems were removed from our inventory without fanfare from the Navy, and without our pressuring the Soviets to make similar reductions. We did this for a very good reason. It is important that we maintain the ability to reduce forces in a way that allows us to tailor our Navy to meet our security requirements, not only vis-a-vis the Soviet, but worldwide.

A goal of arms control should be to enhance the mutual security of the participants. Negotiations which, in effect, restrict the ability of the participants to reduce or restructure their forces to meet national security objectives are counterproductive. The bottom line is that our naval force structure and force levels should continue to be determined by the American people, through their elected representatives, based on our need to respond to a range of worldwide contingencies, rather than as a result of the perceived need to engage in negotiations for their own sake.

Demilitarized or Nuclear-Free Zones

Proposals that limit the ability of any nation to freely operate in international seas runs counter to the security of all nations. Mutual security is, in fact, constrained, not enhanced, by "confidence-building measures" which would restrict free access to portions of the world's oceans.

By calling for the denuclearization or demilitarization of large ocean areas, the Soviets seek to limit the ability of the U.S. to operate freely in international waters. It just does not make good sense to compromise or trade away the vital concept of freedom of the seas for some vague notion of increasing Soviet confidence. As I noted earlier, confidence-building measures which enhance the ability of all nations to move freely on the world's oceans are in our interest, and the U.S. Navy has been in the forefront of supporting those initiatives.

Soviet proposals for nuclear-free zones, ASW keep-out zones, and various prohibited zones are transparent attempts to limit U.S. naval activity throughout the world. At the risk of resurrecting the "domino theory," I would suggest that it would be very difficult to limit geographically constraining arrangements to just the U.S. and the USSR and to only those waters of bilateral concern. It is not difficult to envision the problems that would arise from similar declarations by countries sitting astride critical maritime straits and passages.

Finally, as contemporary events have repeatedly shown, regional crises, terrorism, third world unrest, and the unpredictable actions of despots and tyrants often require a flexible sea-based presence and deterrent to carry out U.S. policy. Bilateral agreements with the Soviets do nothing to address the growing threat to U.S. interests from these sources. Simply put, we must continue to be able to operate our naval forces globally to support and defend our interests, our allies, and our access to markets overseas.

Operational constraints

Other Soviet proposals suggest limiting the number and scale of exercises in specific regions, and seek to limit the number and type of participating ships. This is an extension of the type of confidence building measure that would make major land exercises less threatening. It does not, however, translate well to operations at sea. Naval forces cannot occupy territory or win wars by themselves. Warships operate, not on sovereign territory as do armies, but as sovereign units on the common medium of the world's oceans. This is a very large difference and it is fundamental to the understanding of maritime warfare and the peacetime use of naval forces. The level of effort required to mount a sea-based invasion of Soviet territory is simply beyond our means. A brief review of some of the major amphibious operations undertaken in the last half century bears this out:

o Normandy. Over 5000 ships and 11,000 aircraft sorties were required for the first day of the invasion. For several months prior to the invasion, the entire southern half of Great Britain was quarantined to maintain secrecy. Today Soviet technical intelligence techniques would easily detect a buildup of this magnitude.

o Okinawa. Pre-assault air strikes started 32 days in advance. 1300 ships and 182,000 assault troops participated in this amphibious landing.

o Iwo Jima. Prior to the invasion, the Army Air Corps conducted 74 consecutive days of bombing. Three days prior to the invasion, six battleships and five cruisers and scores of other ships conducted round-the-clock shore bombardment of the island.

In short, it is difficult to understand the Soviet concern for an amphibious assault given the geographic realities and the magnitude of the obstacles that would have to be overcome to seize and hold Soviet territory.

Notification

By their very nature, ships operating at sea are in full view of anyone who desires to observe their movements. There are internationally recognized procedures in use, such as Notice to Mariners and Notice to Airmen, that all nations use to publicize potentially hazardous exercise activity. In addition, we scrupulously adhere to the notification procedures required by the Stockholm Accords, and we support the CDE proposals that apply when naval forces are functionally linked to land-based exercises. Finally, we inform the Soviets when we test our

SLBM's in accordance with the 1987 Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Agreement. Soviet proposals for additional notification procedures are simply redundant and unnecessary.

Conclusion

For over two centuries, the United States has been one of the most consistent proponents of what the noted jurist Grotius called "mare liberum," or the ocean as the great commons of man. Free use of the seas is an inherently democratic concept. To a seagoing naval officer, measures which restrict freedom of movement or require burdensome disclosure run counter to the fundamental international concept of freedom of the seas.

What does make sense is our continuing efforts to ensure the careful and prudent conduct of operations at sea by all nations. Since 1972, when we signed the Incidents at Sea Agreement with the Soviet Union, we have seen a reduction in the kinds of incidents that formerly occurred at sea. Over the years, we have seen a number of similar bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and our NATO allies, modelled on this Incidents at Sea Agreement.

Finally, I must emphasize that U.S. naval commitments are global. Most of our allies and our economic ties are with littoral states linked to us by sea routes that pass through waters proximate to the Soviet Union. Those are the very waters that could fall within restricted areas that would be imposed by Soviet confidence building proposals. Moreover, arms control measures, whether conventional or nuclear, are tools by which nations seek to minimize the risk of confrontation. While that is a worthy goal, we should never lose sight of the fact that successful deterrence in the post-war era has depended in large measure on highly mobile, flexible forces at sea.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you very much, Admiral. Mr. Hadley.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. HADLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. **Hadley**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear here with my colleagues before the subcommittee. I think the statements by Admiral Trost and Ambassador Lehman make clear that it is simply not the case that the United States has stone-walled or had a "just say no" approach to arms control in the naval area, and I will not repeat the points that they have made but would simply say that we are engaged in negotiations affecting various aspects of our naval forces and we have entered into a number of agreements dealing with risks of confrontation and misunderstandings at sea.

I think the point to underscore is that where we have entered into these negotiations it has been based on two premises. One, mentioned by Admiral Trost, that arms control would serve our national security interest. Obviously, arms control is not an end in itself. It should have that objective.

I think the second point, however, is, we have also concluded that arms control was a practical and effective way to solve the particular problem at hand. That, I think, has really two components to it. One, that it would lead to an arrangement which was effectively verifiable. I think it is important that arms control not give a false sense of security, to suggest that we have solved the problem when we have not, because of verification problems.

So one point is, arms control makes sense if you have the verification regime, and second, I think it is also fair to say that arms control makes sense when parity of outcome is a useful outcome. If you look at our approach to arms control generally, parity is a very important principle. You can see it in START and you can see it in CFE.

I think the point Admiral Trost made is, given the asymmetries in geography, given the asymmetries in the roles of our navies and the structures of our forces, given U.S. global interests versus the more narrow role that the Soviet Navy plays, will parity of outcome in terms of arms control be an acceptable outcome, given U.S. interests? I think that is a question that one has to ask when you raise the question of applying arms control to solve a particular problem.

Obviously, for the reasons that my colleagues have mentioned, in a number of areas we have decided that arms control does not meet these tests. Admiral Trost quite rightly pointed out why generally arms control in terms of numerical limitations on conventional nonnuclear naval forces has not made sense—not appeared to us at this point to make sense.

An issue, of course, that has been raised quite consistently is the question about arms control limitations on theater nuclear naval forces. I think the judgment we have made at this point is that those also do not make sense.

I think it is important to keep in mind that these are forces to deter war. We have the notion of being prepared for war so you do not need to fight one, and these are deterrent forces to deter not just nuclear war, but all war, and they fit into the judgment we have made that you need nuclear weapons and the prospects for the role of nuclear weapons in order to make conventional war unpredictable and unacceptable and therefore not something that any potential aggressor would contemplate. Obviously, the ultimate guarantor of that is our strategic nuclear weapons, but we need theater nuclear forces, and that includes naval theater nuclear forces, as an essential link to that deterrent to deter not just nuclear war but conventional war as well.

My last point is simply, then, I think in light of this approach that those advocating a greater role for arms control with respect to naval forces really have the burden of the argument, and they really have to establish two things: one, how an arms control solution would advance our national security interests, and second how arms control could provide a practical solution to the problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]

TESTIMONY
BY
STEPHEN J. HADLEY

Good Morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, and other distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee. I welcome this opportunity to address the subject of naval arms control, particularly in light of the comments of your recent guest, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. I am confident that Ambassador Lehman, Admiral Trost and I can provide you a comprehensive and convincing report of the Administration's position and concerns on the topic. More importantly, however, I trust you will gain an appreciation for the willingness of the United States government to engage in serious discussion of naval issues, and serious negotiation with other states when there is potential for mutual security benefit.

The United States has been criticized for resorting to a "Just Say No" approach in response to Soviet proposals for naval arms control. Leveling such an accusation ignores the complexity and seriousness of these issues. In fact, where appropriate and meaningful, the United States has supported as well as initiated discussion, negotiation and agreements relating to maritime activities and naval forces. Today I would like to focus on some of the reasons more frequently asserted why the United States should embrace the multitude of Soviet naval arms control proposals, the faulty assumptions behind these reasons, and, by contrast, the soundness of our participation, indeed our activism, in a number of regimes that successfully reduce the likelihood of unplanned and unwanted naval conflict.

Ever since the initiation of welcome but unfinished fundamental political change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, naval arms control has been cited as the "next logical step" in reducing East-West military tensions. One of the more vocal proponents of this view is Marshal Akhromeyev. In his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee last summer, Akhromeyev referred, and I quote, to the "US desire first to reach agreement on cutting the ground forces in Europe ... and then build up its naval forces without any constraints, especially its carrier battle groups, thus gaining military superiority in order to dictate its will to the USSR and create a continuous threat to Soviet interests." More recently, at a conference on naval arms control in Moscow, Akhromeyev outlined a four step process he claimed was necessary to improve US-Soviet relations: (1) reduction of strategic offensive armaments; (2) reduction of Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces in Europe; (3) commencement of negotiations on the reduction of naval forces; and (4) step by step elimination of US military bases around the Soviet Union, first and foremeost - naval bases. He has also implied that US resistance to steps (3) and (4) would prevent completion of the first two.

I fail to see the logic in this argument. First of all, it assumes that arms control agreements are the engine of improved relations between states. I believe arms control can provide helpful, positive reinforcement to a process of improving relations. However, I also think that if arms control were the chicken, and improved relations, particularly when grounded in fundamental political change toward democratic institutions, were the egg, we would have finally resolved the ages old question on the side of the egg. Secondly, although naval forces are clearly an integral part of overall US military strategy and capabilities, and although they play a critical role in the defense of our allies, they themselves do not lie at the source of potential US-Soviet or East-West military confrontation. Rather, it is the unnecessarily large and poorly balanced arsenals of US and

Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, the high concentration of NATO and Warsaw Pact land-based forces in Central Europe, the overwhelming Soviet superiority in ground forces among European nations, and Soviet adventurism in Asia that has created instability in East-West military relations. Thus, the appropriate focus of any arms control discussions relating to naval forces should not be a face off of system for system, ship for ship, or base for base, devoid of political and geostrategic context. There must be an assessment of naval forces in the context of these sources of confrontation.

For example, in the START talks, the US position would affect naval forces in so far as proposed ceilings on ballistic missile warheads could have an impact on the number of SSBNs deployed by either side. The question of SLCMs, however, is quite different. SLCMs contribute to stability because of their diverse capabilities, flexible employment, and dispersal aboard many survivable surface combatants and submarines. By distributing strike power to approximately 200 launch platforms vice only a limited number of aircraft carriers, we have multiplied Soviet uncertainties, reduced the incentive for preemptive strike, and thereby enhanced deterrence. Because of this flexibility, as well as the inability to distinguish between conventional and nuclear SLCMs, a direct limit on SLCMs is unverifiable. However, in order to build trust and openness with respect to nuclear policy, the United States has proposed that both sides make annual declarations of planned deployments of nuclear-armed SCLMs with a range greater that three hundred kilometers.

In the CFE negotiations, East and West agreed to exclude naval forces by mandate. In our view, this exclusion represents recognition of the fundamental differences between NATO as a maritime alliance and the Warsaw Pact as an alliance of contiguous states, as well as the fact that naval forces are not central to the problem of instablity in Europe. However, the West is proposing that permenently land-based naval aircraft be acounted for in the negotiations because exclusion of such aircraft on the basis of their subordination alone represents an unacceptable circumvention loophole. For example, Soviet Naval Aviation Backfires and Fencers are virtually identical to Soviet Air Force ground attack versions. Thus, the transfer of ground attack versions to naval forces would not impede their ability to complete their mission.

Finally, in the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures, naval forces are covered by the mandate in so far as their activities are linked to ground activities which the participants agree to address. In 1986, this mandate was the basis for agreement between the 35 CSCE states on prior notification and observation of amphibious exercises, ship-to-shore gunfire, and ship-to-shore support activities. Despite its generally low profile, the CSBM mandate epitomizes the US approach to naval arms control. It addresses the potential role of naval forces in an attempt by an aggressor to seize and hold territory, in this case in Europe, but recognizes the need not to interfere with either a navy's defensive mission specific to a region or the multi-mission and multi-regional responsibilities of naval forces on the high seas. My point is that each of these sets of negotiations incorporates relevant naval issues in a manner appropriate to US national secruity interests, the inherent characteristics of naval forces, and the nature of the East-West confrontation under discussion.

Another major reason frequently given for initiating broad-based naval arms control negotiations is that forward deployed naval forces and their conduct of large-scale training activities are inherently destabilizing. Again, Marshal Akhromeyev enthusiastically advances this point, citing the "mighty forward-based striking units in the immediate vicinity of USSR territory," plans "to conduct operations not only against the Soviet Navy but also to deliver blows at the territories of the Soviet Union," and, therefore, Soviet concern about the actions of US naval forces in peacetime and the potential for direct or accidental confrontation between the US and Soviet navies.

One "solution" proposed by the Soviets is the establishment of zones of restricted naval activity and minimum stand-off distances fron naval forces capable of attacking land targets. The clear intent of these proposals is to draw a cordon sanitaire at sea for the Soviets while directly challenging US security and commercial interests in the affected sea areas. Although obviously one-sided, what I find more disturbing is how clearly these proposals reveal real and fundamental differences in our respective views about the contribution of naval forces to stability. The Soviets appear to equate any limits, constraints or confidence building measures on ground, air and naval forces with stability, making no distinctions between the objectives, missions, patterns of activity and traditions of the three forces. In essence, the stability sought by the Soviets is the predictability sought by the planner. The more a military planner knows about the comings and goings of his adversary's forces, the easier it is for him to negate their impact. But when the defensive capabilities of those forces rely on mobility, survivability and a certain amount of independent power projection, imposing strict limits and predictability on their activities will only be destabilizing.

The US views stability from the broader perspective of deterrence, which by definition involves a certain amount of uncertainty. With respect to forward deployed naval forces, and especially our carrier battle groups, deterrence requires the ability to deter all forms of aggression, including nuclear aggression, and to respond to regional and global contingencies. This, in turn, requires that we maintain a presence in ocean areas critical to our interests in order to provide visible evidence of US resolve and commitment and to increase or decrease force levels rapidly without third country approval or direct support. This, in turn, requires both a sizeable force and guaranteed freedom of movement.

In addition to the concern about the capabilities of US aircraft carriers, Akhromeyev and other critics of US naval power argue that the size and activities of US battle group forces reveal our intention to "control the seas." I actually agree with this conclusion, although I believe that Akhromeyev and I have something very different in mind when we invoke the concept of control of the sea. As one analyst has put it, control of the sea means that "one is able to use the seas purposefully in time of war, and that enemies can be prevented from denying such use. Sea control is geographically specific, and it may be transitory. The concept does not imply global scope; that is, both the US and its adversaries might be able to exercise sea control in specific sea areas at certain times." The reinforcement and resupply of Europe in a crisis is an excellent example. 95% of military cargo sent by the US to Europe in this situation would travel by ship. Establishing control of the sea lines of communication is thus critical, and requires superior US and NATO naval forces to secure and maintain the link. The extensive presence of the US Navy in the Pacific provides further insight into what we mean by control of the sea. In the Pacific, we have played the role of regional balancer, honest broker and ultimate security guarantor for over thirty years. No other power is able or acceptable to play such a role, and a perceived US reluctance to do so would be inherently destabilizing. On a more specific note, 90% of all oil on its way to Japan passes through restricted waterways in South Asia which could easily be blocked in the event of regional conflict. Thus, it would appear that Soviet proposals to "protect" passage through international straits by limiting naval activity in the area would be attractive to both sides. However, restrictions on passage through international straits have implications far beyond the immediate vicinity of the particular straits in question and would therefore inhibit our ability to respond to any number of contingencies. Furthermore, there is no way to prevent undetected entry by submarines, and thus no guarantee that a treaty commitment alone could provide safe passage. The basic point, though, is that in wartime, control of the sea is prudent military policy, and in peacetime, control of the sea is not a zero sum game. It does not necessarily entail regional hegemonic control. Neither in the Mediterranean nor in the Pacific does the United States exercise or seek to gain political or economic domination on the basis of its military power.

In addition to differences in US and Soviet understandings of stability and control of the sea, there is a third divergence in our views on the role of forward based naval forces that appears to lie behind Soviet proposals to limit their numbers and activities. Soviet spokesmen argue that forward deployments pose a threat of surprise attack and accidental or inadvertent attack and escalation. There is no evidence, however, to support the claim that naval forces are inherently dangerous. US and Soviet forces routinely operate in close proximity to each other without threat or use of force by either side. Where we have identified areas with potential for accidental and unwanted conflict, we have initiated agreements with the Soviets to reduce the likelihood of such an occurrence. Furthermore, while naval forces can achieve surprise at a local, tactical level, the start of a major conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States by a surprise attack from the surface of the sea is an unrealistic scenario. In fact, Akhromeyev himself has stated that he does not think the US will attack the

USSR. I only wish he would take the next step in this reasoning and recognize that unimpeded mobility allows the Soviets to guard against surprise. In international waters, our naval forces are monitored by the Soviets exercising their right to freedom of the seas using a wide variety of reconnaissance and warning asssets, such as space systems and long range patrol aircraft. Although excellent tools of diplomacy that allow the US a broad spectrum of responses to contingencies, from simple presence to the application of force, surface naval forces could not by themselves achieve strategic surprise.

When all is said and done about the Soviet call for broad-based naval arms control negotiations, the fundamental argument advanced by the Soviets is one of fairness. According to Colonel General Gareev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, "NATO has superiority in strike aviation and naval forces. Elementary fairness and interest in security says that we cannot unilaterally have one set of imbalances removed and another set not removed." This is a generalized complaint frequently aired but rarely expanded upon or explained by the Soviets. Invocations of fairness have some appeal, but they are not compelling. In the West, we hear their echo in the form of admonitions that we must somehow accomodate Soviet concerns in the naval area in order that Gorbachev not lose face by having to make all the concessions.

If there were any substance to this "fairness doctrine," it could only lie in a belief that parity in naval forces is desirable and achievable. This is both wrong and naive. For nuclear systems that by and large target each other or serve as mutual deterrents, and for conventional forces that directly confront each other ready for combat, parity makes sense, although it is difficult enough to measure and negotiate. For naval forces, the difficulties are magnified by the fact that specific categories do not operate in direct opposition to each other. For example, frigates do not engage frigates, and amphibious ships do not engage amphibious ships. Furthermore, it is the rule rather than the exception that, in nearly all navies, ships of a class demonstrate large variations.

The question of difficulty, however, is not decisive. The asymmetries of Soviet and US naval forces are, first and foremost, a reflection of fundamental differences in their purposes and requirements. For the US, the navy plays a key role in linking us to the common defense we have joined with our friends and allies. As already discussed, the reinforcement and resupply of our allies in times of tension or war also require protection of -- and control over -- large areas of sea, sufficient escorts and well-balanced naval assets. Although US power projection is an important contributor to deterrence of Soviet aggression, it serves many and varied deterrent functions apart from the direct US/Soviet equation. In addition, naval forces can demonstrate political resolve in a less escalatory way than land or air forces since they can be deployed for long periods of time without geographical limitations, since external support and without infringing on national sovereignties. The US navy also plays a key role in protecting the economic use of the sea. Fishing, oil and gas exploitation, as well as trading, are of critical importance to both our NATO and Pacific allies. Although the high seas are free for all to use, assets at sea are correspondingly vulnerable to those who wish to interrupt free trade.

The Soviet navy, by contrast, has a very different military mission, one in which defense of the homeland, direct interdiction of hostile naval forces and denial of US and allied access to sea lines of communication are the main objectives. These requirements do not demand as large, diverse or geographically dispersed a naval force as do the requirements of the US navy. Parity, therefore, would immediately satisfy Soviet objectives while completely undercutting US ability to fulfill its more varied role.

In attempting to respond to the more basic and appealing arguments advanced in favor of naval arms control, I am afraid that I have given the Soviets and their proposals more credit than they are due. In over thirty years of public diplomacy aimed at chipping away at support, both in the US and among its friends and allies, for a strong US Navy, the Soviets have little to show for their efforts. They repeat and reissue old proposals which have found no forum they can call home. (A few stats on the number of proposals, statements etc.) Indeed, at the one forum where the US has had to debate the question of naval arms control most vigorously -- the CSCE negotiations on confidence and security building measures -- the Soviets have begun to witness serious erosion of support from their Warsaw Pact allies on this very question. As the new governments of Eastern European states assert their independence, they are making clear that they do not feel threatened by US or NATO naval forces. Furthermore, the Soviets' proposals have been so one-sided or so lacking in specificity as to lead one to question their seriousness. Although clearly intended to put the US on the defensive, many of the proposals are fair weather measures, cosmetic or artifical limitations to which no state could be expected to adhere in time of war or serious crisis. In sum, I believe that characterizations of the Soviet naval arms control campaign by a number of commentators as "hydra-headed", "unfocused", and driven by "ad-hoc-ery" are right on the mark. The real question, then, is what in the naval sphere are Soviet political and military leaders really concerned about?

In stark contrast to the sweeping generalities and vague images of threat that characterize the Soviet naval arms control campaign, the United States has sought to address specific and unique concerns about the use and behavior of naval forces. Our approach is grounded in a firm, historically consistent belief in freedom of navigation for all and a commitment to defend our security and commercial interests and those of our allies. This approach, I submit to you, has proven its value over and over again. With respect to arms control negotiations, it provides the framework for inclusion or exclusion of particular naval forces. Thus, as already mentioned, we are negotiating on appropriate, relevant naval forces in the START and CSBM negotiations. In the Pacific, invitations to the signatories of the Korean armistice and to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee to observe the exercise Team Spirit are but one example of our efforts to lower tensions in the region. Recent Soviet announcements of some of their Far East military force posture are welcome, although I would point out that information on all US force posture is easily accessible in the public domain.

Where US focus on concerns specific to potential, unwanted naval conflict has borne the most fruit is the area covered by the bilateral US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement. Initiated by the US and concluded in 1972, this seminal agreement has been very successful at enabling unhampered operations of navies while reducing the risk of incidents arising out of uncertainty or from improper aggressive behavior at sea. The agreement sets a standard of propriety when ships and aircraft of the armed forces of the two nations are maneuvering in each other's vicinity. A number of countries have called for expanding the regime on a multilateral basis. However, its success lies in the fact that it directly addresses concerns unique to the activities and interaction of the US and Soviet navies. Confirmation of this is evident in the conclusion of similar agreements between the USSR and France, the United Kingdom and West Germany and on-going negotiations between the Soviets and the Netherlands, Canada and Norway.

Another example of US activism in the resolution of naval issues is the recently signed US/Soviet Dangerous Military Activities agreement which includes obligations and highly specific procedures to resolve incidents that may occur during operations on the sea without the threat or use of force. Through informal discussion, we resolved the underlying legal issues that led to the 1988 bumping of US warships by the Soviets in the Black Sea. And last year's historic exchange of port visits by US and Soviet navies was by no means an insignificant step. It is our belief that more extensive military to military contacts, whether under the auspices of an international agreement, such as the annual review conferences mandated by the INCSEA agreement (which are ongoing this week), or as diplomatic gestures, can lay an important foundation for the United States and the Soviet Union to clarify misunderstandings and concerns about our respective navies.

Let me conclude with one final point. Despite thirty years of public diplomacy pressure to respond to a disparate set of naval arms control intitiatives, the Soviet Union is in fact, I believe, coming to understand and accept at least the fundamental principles that guide our responses. The growing body of custom, legislation and bilateral agreements on the behavior of ships and the use of the sea has served to promote consensus on the economic, political and security benefits of unfettered freedom of navigation. Since signing the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Soviet Union has gradually acknowledged during discussions with the United States that unilateral maritime claims of sovereignty on areas of the high seas and restrictions on the innocent passage of warships in the territorial sea only encourage other states to assert similar claims and are detrimental to Soviet interests as a maritime nation. Thus, the Soviet Union has moved to bring most (but not all) of its maritime claims into conformity with the navigation provisions of the 1982 Convention. I see this as a very positive step and indicative of an evolution of thought that restrictions on navigational freedoms are against our mutual interests. Perhaps the next step will be for the Soviets to recognize that our policy of peacetime presence and crisis response capability is not solely directed at them.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much to all of the members of the panel. I think it is very clear from the commentaries that you each have different perspectives as far as the administration is concerned and the reasons for it. Certainly all of us believe in a strong Navy, and all of us understand that we are a maritime country and certainly, as we have pointed out to Mr. Akhromeyev, and very briefly in the opening statements, we recognize a number of the proposals that have been advanced by the Soviet Union are nonstarters.

I mentioned in my opening statement before Mr. Akhromeyev, that the real questions that Marshal Akhromeyev focused on during the course of the hearing was on the tactical nuclear weapons, as we have seen in this chart.

NAVAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

	BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS	SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES	TACTICAL WEAPONS BOMBS
ARSENALS			
US	5000	300	2200
USSR	3600	50-350	2700-3000
ARMS CONTROL	START (Limits would reduce both arsenals)	START SIDE AGREEMENT (Both sides declare SLCM deployments)	NO CONSTRAINTS

Generally, these figures are from the Congressional Research Service. They are basically ball-park figures. We see, then, the areas where the naval nuclear weapons are divided into the ballistic missiles, the sea-launched cruise and the tactical weapons, and where we have the ballistic missile warheads, the SLBMS. They are under negotiation now in the START negotiations. The sea-launched cruise missiles again are under the START negotiations.

The only area where there are not negotiations is with regard to the tactical weapons, an area where at least the Soviet Union has comparable figures and, some estimate, may have some greater diversity. There are even those that believe that narrow area may have some kind of advantage, but that is the only area.

In the areas where we have the greatest advantage, in the ballistic missiles, sea-launched, they are on the table. In the area where we have close parity in terms of the tactical nuclear weapons, there is an unwillingness to consider any kind of agreements on that, at least as I understand it.

Now, let me go back to some rather basic questions, or issues. I will ask the staff to have us follow a 10-minute rule.

It seems to me that you have three different questions. Whether or not some kind of agreement in this area is acceptable. Is it in the U.S. security interest that we have some kind of agreement? We have to make that threshold decision, because if it is not, it does not make any sense to negotiate it, and it does not make any sense to try to verify it, unless we can make some kind of judgment that it is in the security interest of the United States.

Now, the United States is not saying that in the area of strategic arms we can negotiate on that. There is no suggestion that we are compromising our national security and our national interest. No one is suggesting that. We are negotiating a CFE treaty in Western Europe, and no one is suggesting that we are compromising our national security interest there, so a question has to be asked, would we be sacrificing our national security interest if we were to have an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons? That was clearly in the interest. It has to be, or it will not be approved by the administration or ratified by the U.S. Senate.

But is there any basis for an agreement for tactical nuclear weapons at sea? Now that is the question, and it is against the background where we have had Admiral Crowe himself who felt that this was a legitimate area to pursue. Ambassador Nitze believed that it was a legitimate area to pursue based upon studies, internal studies that were done for the Navy.

So my question, Ambassador Lehman, is, is a ban on the tactical nuclear weapons in our security interest? Do you have an opinion?

SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

Ambassador LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, we do not believe so, certainly not at this stage in security negotiations. As you know, under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, we are mandated by law to be looking toward ultimate disarmament, and so it is our policy always to recognize that there is that ultimate goal out there, but the law is very clear that this has to be done in a process that addresses our security interests all the way.

It is for that reason that we have frequently found that naval arms control proposals that look attractive at first often are very much to the disadvantage of the United States and its friends and allies. If we take a look at your chart, I would just like to make a couple of comments. In the category, sea-launched cruise missiles, the chart assumes the definition of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.

There are a lot of short-range sea-launched cruise missiles which I assume this chart has placed under tactical weapons and bombs, but those shorter-range sea-launched cruise missiles can strike a large percentage of the United States and its allies, the territory, whereas comparable missiles on our side would not have anywhere near the same target coverage with respect to the land territory of the Soviet Union.

Now, are we prepared to talk about this issue? Well, let me tell you, in Moscow, in the ministerial, when we were negotiating the declaratory approach, we suggested to the Soviet Union that the sides present the numbers for their nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of all ranges—of all ranges. They would not accept that. They said they only wanted a definition that gets the ones over 600 kilometers. Now, we are not unreasonable, so we compromised. We said, "All right, we will agree. How about 300 kilometers?" No, they would not agree to that.

What is the problem? Why can they not just agree to a declaratory approach on these shorter-range sea-launched cruise missiles? The answer I think is for them to give definitively, but it appears that they do not want to recognize that what they are after are the type of cruise missiles we need. They do not want to talk about the kind of cruise missiles that you are talking about.

Senator KENNEDY. Okay. Now, I know that the whole issue on the range of the SLCMs is a matter of negotiation now. We have tried to stay out, and I think the members are going to be interested in the progress that we are making in those areas. What we are talking about is anti-ship missiles. We are talking about torpedoes; we are talking about bombs; we are talking about depth charges.

You get into the question of the SLCMs and the range, and it is extremely important, but by and large we are talking about this other area of tactical nuclear weapons. There are those, at least from the studies I have made, that said, if we had a conventional war with the Soviet Union at sea the U.S. Navy would win it, and win it pretty clearly, but if we had a nuclear war at sea where tactical nuclear weapons were used, it would probably destroy both navies.

Now, I do not know whether Admiral Trost would agree with that assessment. I have heard it said before the Armed Services Committee from Admiral Crowe that the only thing that can sink an aircraft carrier is a nuclear weapon. Maybe that is true, maybe it is not, but we have to have the land, air and all the rest, which Akhromeyev indicated they would put on the table.

The question is, why are we so reluctant to even enter into a discussion of these matters? Why are we not prepared even to talk? I mean, we can always say we have not been able to make progress. We can always say well, what they are prepared to agree to or go for is unacceptable, but I do not find terribly convincing, this idea that we have a full plate, when the President himself put on the modernization of land-based systems only this past week. We know we have a full plate.

But why is it that we have had three different baskets that have been discussed at Geneva? If you do not believe that any kind of agreement on the tactical nuclear weapons makes any sense whatsoever, then it is a nonstarter. There is no question whether it can be negotiated or whether it can be verified. But the real kind of question is whether you could get to reach those anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, bombs, and depth charges, and whether, if you were able to get in there, whether it is in the Navy's interest.

Admiral Trost.

Admiral TROST. Senator Kennedy, I would agree with your comment about the survivability of aircraft carriers, and with your comments about the outcome, or the likely outcome of conventional war at sea. The issue of tactical nuclear weapons is not one of "do we not want to have an agreement?" If we could find an agreement in our interest, we would.

I would note, and I would ask Ambassador Lehman to correct me, that the Soviets, absent the statement of Marshal Akhromeyev before this subcommittee 3 days ago, have never laid on the table all tactical nuclear weapons. The issue has been sea-launched cruise missiles, specifically the Tomahawk cruise missile because of its land attack variant and its capability. They have steadfastly refused to discuss all sea-launched cruise missiles, because to do so would capture the armament on every one of their ships, surface ships and submarines.

I stood, just last October, on the shores looking out at their northern fleet, and there is not a ship out there that does not have numerous missile launchers, all of the missiles being nuclear-capable. We have tried, as Ambassador Lehman has noted, to say let us put it all on the table—all cruise missiles, starting with range zero. To do that captures the primary armament they have targeted against our Navy, and they are unwilling to do that. They do, however, want to capture our capability.

On the balance, I am unfamiliar with any reduction in Soviet nuclear weapons capability at any time over the years that matches the fact that we have voluntarily withdrawn three classes of tactical nuclear weapons from our sea-based platforms, as we felt they were becoming obsolescent and that we could replace it with a conventional capability, which has been our longstanding goal.

So, it is not that we are stone-walling. We are prepared to talk, but that has never been laid on the table.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, you know, we have seen that reduction, and some could ask why did we not use that in negotiation and get something for it. I suppose you could have that issue and that question.

Before winding up, let me ask this. Are you saying that we would be worse off in a world with no naval nuclear weapons than in the current one?

Admiral TROST. We would be worse off with no nuclear weapons at sea if we are still faced with the nuclear weapons aboard long-range Soviet naval aviation and Air Force subordinated aviation which could continue to be a threat, and all of this presumes absolute verification of all weapons.

Senator KENNEDY. Okay. Now, if we accept that and if you were able to get land-based air that is attached to the Navy and be able to verify it, is that the position?

Admiral TROST. Again, if they were to do that, but that has not been laid out on the table at this point.

Senator KENNEDY. I am just trying to understand where we are.

Admiral TROST. If we could, with proper confidence in their willingness to abide by an agreement, ensure that there were no nuclear weapons that threaten either side's ships at sea, I am sure we would both feel more comfortable that way.

Senator **Kennedy**. And it would be essential that air be included in that?

Admiral **Trost**. Absolutely.

Mr. **Hadley**. I think, Mr. Chairman, the Admiral's statement suggests one of the problems of how you would work that out. His phrase was, if there were no air-delivered weapons that could threaten the carriers at sea. And Marshal Akhromeyev talked about the Backfire. That is certainly one. There are certainly other Soviet medium bombers. There are also the heavy bombers that the Soviets can have under START which could also serve that role. So I think that is the problem. It is not a neat package simply to look at naval nuclear weapons at sea. It does not solve the problem in terms of ensuring the survivability.

Senator **Kennedy**. Well, we have more heavy bombers than they do.

Mr. **Hadley**. Absolutely.

Ambassador **Lehman**. Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Kennedy**. Yes.

VERIFICATION

Ambassador **Lehman**. If I might comment, it is not as if this is a new proposal, though. We studied this for years. There have been a lot of studies on this. On the verification side a number of things jump out at you.

One is even if we could employ the very best verification measures that we have been able to develop, this is still a not very effective regime that one could imagine. What jumps out at you is that it is a peacetime regime in which tensions are low. But the ability to covertly deploy missiles on ships is so easy that for preemption in any crisis or in a war we would still be faced with the same challenge except that we would have given them up on our side. But there is a second dimension here, and I think it really has to be understood, especially by this subcommittee, and that is most of the measures that are proposed to get a handle on nuclear weapons end up having a very deleterious effect on our conventional capability and on conventional weapons and, indeed, in many cases one gets the impression that what the Soviet Union is after, as much as anything, is to limit our conventional as much as our nuclear capability.

So, again, it is not that we are just simply saying no. It is not that we are not doing our homework. It is not that we are saying our plate is too full. It is full. We will do things that we believe are in our interest. But here we spent a lot of time studying it, and we just have not found very much.

Senator **Kennedy**. Well, there is no one who is suggesting that the first question you have to reach is whether the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons at sea, with that kind of air support, is in the interest of the Navy. Second, can something be negotiated which still continues to meet that interest? And, third, the question of verification. We had great questions at the time of INF on whether we were going to have adequate possibilities of verification.

As you remember so well, Mr. Ambassador, 90 percent of the debate and hearings in the Senate was on verification, but we still went ahead. We had enormous problems in terms of complexities, whether we could have an adequate verification. It certainly seems and appears that we are going to have that.

The President just announced he is canceling the modernization and plans to negotiate limits on the short-range ground-based nuclear forces and those systems are dual capable. They are small and mobile and widely dispersed, and there are going to be enormously, significant problems in terms of the verification. So, I do not think anyone minimizes that.

I think all of us have to recognize that anything that is going to be negotiated has to be in the security interest. I think it has been true with what President Reagan and President Bush have suggested and what I would suspect with any recommendation in this particular area.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman and Admiral, as a Republican I have to be careful to make sure that I phrase this correctly. Do I understand that in response to Senator Kennedy's question that if everything were on the table, excluding taxes——

Senator KENNEDY. Are we back to that again? [Laughter.]

Senator COHEN. That if everything were put on the table by the Soviets, tactical nuclear weapons, short-range cruise missiles, medium-range bombers, heavy bombers that might be assigned to naval attack, that it would be in our interest to negotiate with the Soviets concerning naval arms control?

Admiral TROST. I will retract any concurrence with the statement on naval arms control and respond to your question with regard to the control of tactical nuclear weapons. I would say, yes, it could be in our interest with all the "ifs" I previously stated included, and you could label me as a lifetime pessimist on the likelihood of concluding such an agreement.

Senator COHEN. So your precondition for entering the negotiations is that everything has to be on the table as far as the impact upon our Navy?

Admiral TROST. That is correct.

Senator COHEN. Now, you were fairly categorical, at least in your statement about how the United States has adhered to treaties in the past, and there is at least a question as to whether the Soviets have had the same rigidity of compliance. Would you want to give some specific examples of where there is doubt that has existed?

Admiral TROST. Well, we have from time to time had doubt introduced on compliance of treaties by such things as the Krasnoyarsk radar and whether or not it has been, in fact, made inoperable. We hear the arguments about our violation of the spirit of an ABM Treaty because of the SDI research that has gone on while nothing has been said by the Soviets about their own ABM system which has been in place and which is being upgraded.

We have the issue of the SS-23 missiles which were just recently discussed. "Oh, my gosh, we forgot to tell you about the fact that we gave them to Eastern Europe." I do not accept that argument at all, since there was quite a lot of discussion on missiles in the hands of other than the U.S. and Soviet forces during the negotiations of those treaties.

So my tendency to accept—"believe me, I am not doing it"—is not very high.

Senator COHEN. With respect to Krasnoyarsk, Marshal Akhromeyev said that it is being dismantled. Could either you or Ambassador Lehman tell us whether, in fact, it is being dismantled?

Admiral TROST. I cannot.

KRASNOYARSK

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator, I am somewhat limited in what I can say, but we have no evidence of the actual physical dismantling of the radar itself. But at the very highest levels, the Soviet Union has assured us that they know it is a violation, and they will eliminate it. They will destroy it to the ground.

Senator COHEN. Just so the record is clear, the Soviet Union did for years, several years, maintain that it was not in violation of the ABM Treaty. In fact, it was being used or it was designed to track their satellites and not as a battle management ABM system. And that recent conversion in terms of opinion came about only in the last 6 or 7 months, as I recall that, in fact, it was designed to serve as an ABM system.

Ambassador LEHMAN. That is correct.

Senator COHEN. I can probably preempt you, Mr. Lehman, in terms of other questionable areas. During SALT I, there was a prohibition on future heavy missiles, specifically the SS–18. After the signing of that particular treaty we saw the SS–19, which was not a heavy missile but a light-heavy missile, as I recall. I think that does call into question the need for real specificity.

In order to have an adequate verification scheme for sea-launched cruise missiles, when negotiating treaties with anyone, especially the Soviet Union, I would assume you would have to have fairly intrusive verification measures. Have you arrived at any kind of satisfactory verification measure? Do you know what would be satisfactory?

VERIFICATION

Ambassador LEHMAN. We have found no satisfactory way to verify a cruise missile ban or a numerical limit on cruise missiles. There are many technologies that one can use that under the right circumstances, if you are extremely close to a nuclear weapon you may or may not be able to detect it, but the complications become immense, but the reality is that ships are large, they are metal, and in many cases they have nuclear reactors on board.

They are constantly replenishing, replenishing at sea, replenishing at land, having port calls. You end up eventually talking about a cradle-to-grave system of immense complexity and, even at that, one asks what is it you get out of this.

I am prepared to say that if you turn the Soviet Navy over to us, we can verify that they do not have any nuclear weapons on their navy.

But if we turn our Navy over to the Soviet Union, I am not sure that I could verify that they have not put their nuclear weapons on our Navy. It is a very, very complex verification task.

Senator COHEN. Have you been negotiating the Open Skies proposal on the part of the United States?

OPEN SKIES

Ambassador LEHMAN. I was at the opening conference. I was not the negotiator.

Senator COHEN. Apparently there is some question being raised that the Soviets object to the Open Skies proposal because of the intrusive measures that the United States would want to require; namely, the overflight in large areas of the Soviet Union.

Is that your understanding?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Yes, Senator. We have proposed a great deal of freedom for each side to determine what sensors it would use. It is not absolute, but basically we would have it be very, very encompassing. They are very much opposed or have been thus far to having anything more than the most basic sensors.

Senator COHEN. Is there any inconsistency in insisting upon very intrusive measures for the verification of at-sea missile systems and being opposed to intrusive measures for land-based systems?

Ambassador LEHMAN. I guess you could say that. The Soviet approach to verification has sort of changed over the years. It used to be that they would agree to nothing in principle but you might get a few specific provisions. Then they went into this period in which they agreed to everything in principle but you still could not get the specific provisions.

Now we have had a tremendous amount of success in negotiating very useful specific provisions, but each side has to look at the provisions in terms of its own security very carefully.

Senator COHEN. In our hearing on Tuesday, Marshal Akhromeyev said there never has been a single nuclear warhead or nuclear weapon in the territory of the GDR. Is that accurate as far as you know? Do you have any disagreement with that?

Admiral TROST. I do not know if it is accurate or not, but it surprised the hell out of me because we had thought all along, and I believe they had stated in the past, that their forces were armed with short range nuclear weapons and they withdrew SS–20s from Eastern Europe. So I do not know what kind of weapons they had available.

Senator COHEN. Ambassador Lehman.

Ambassador LEHMAN. I think that was a very eloquent statement of my view. [Laughter.]

Mr. HADLEY. We were quite surprised at the Marshal's statement.

Senator COHEN. Marshal Akhromeyev said we have no negotiations; we are just simply tossing out proposals. The proposals that I understand have been tossed out or initiated by him and others would include limitations upon the size of our fleet, the time and areas of operation.

Is that accurate?

SOVIET PROPOSALS

Ambassador **Lehman**. Yes, sir. Senator Cohen, over the years we have had so many of these proposals. Most of them are the same proposals, slightly repackaged, presented in a new regional context, but by and large they all have the same characteristics; that is to say, they tend to go after the capabilities that we have to support our allies and friends. I will give you just some of the generic problems. They will often have notifications that would not only inhibit our ability to respond to certain types of crises and rescue operations, things of that nature, but you often find them couched in things like tonnage.

If you look at the U.S. Navy, you realize that to get to the other side of the ocean, to operate there for an extensive period of time and to meet the requirements of an all-volunteer navy you have to have larger ships with more fuel, more room, and suddenly you discover that inherently right away in their proposals they are one-sided. That is just one small example of the long litany.

Senator **Cohen**. Let me be specific. What would have been the impact on the United States' ability to respond to the situation in Lebanon following the murder of Colonel Higgins or perhaps, in addition to that, our ability to have responded to Colonel Qaddafi's bombing in Germany? What impact would that have had, if any?

Admiral **Trost**. Had we complied with all of their various proposals, we simply would not have had the forces there to do it.

I think it is necessary to note that they have, through the medium of speeches by Soviet leaders, primarily made a lot of proposals that would both constrain the operational flexibility of our units and also the size of our fleet. They have not been able to formally make such proposals in any of the arms control negotiations which are ongoing because they, themselves, signed up to the mandates governing the conduct of those hearings and agreed that naval forces were not up for discussion except that in the area of Confidence and Security Building Measures, those maritime forces that had a direct impact on the land mass of Europe such as amphibious operations, shore bombardments, such types of exercises, would be considered.

Now one of the proposals, for example, was made by my counterpart, Admiral Chernavin, in about April 1988 as I recall, where he proposed that all aircraft carriers be banned from operation in the Mediterranean. Of course, the only aircraft carriers that routinely operated in the Mediterranean are our own and those of the French navy and the helicopter carrier or the VSTOL carrier of the Italian navy. Clearly, had we complied with such an agreement or signed up for it, those forces would not have been available to react. Had we agreed to the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace as proposed by the Soviet Union, we would not have had the forces available to respond.

Senator **Cohen**. I think it is an important point to keep in mind as we are looking at how we can achieve some sort of a rational and responsible balance with respect to the Soviet Union that we have other interests, that our Navy is designed to serve not only as a deterrent to an attack by the Soviet Union but to serve our interests in other regions of the world that have nothing to do with the Soviet Union.

I was particularly intrigued in reading a statement that was attributed to Marshal Akhromeyev, for example, that he said that our presence in the Persian Gulf was a "dangerous provocation", and the question I have in my mind is to whom. Was it a dangerous provocation to the Soviet Union? I do not think so.

Was it a necessary exercise on our part to protect the sea lines of communication and the flow of Persian Gulf oil? The answer is I think in the affirmative. Yes.

Would we have been precluded from carrying out such a mission to aid the Kuwaitis with some of the proposals put forth by the Soviet Union? I do not know, but I doubt it.

So I think as we try to undertake an examination as to whether it is in our national security interest to arrive at agreements with the Soviet Union whether we compromise them in areas well beyond the interests of the Soviets themselves.

I would like to ask a couple more questions if I could, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Kennedy**. Sure.

Senator **Cohen**. Ambassador Lehman, Marshal Akhromeyev was asked about the ministerial that was signed earlier back in December 1987. It was a joint statement. He said there was a numerical limit agreed to and that we are pushing both sides, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, to respect those levels.

I have read that 1987 joint statement, and I do not find an actual numerical limit, and I am perplexed by this. I do not know what to make of it.

1987 JOINT STATEMENT

Ambassador **Lehman**. You are correct, Senator. I was involved in negotiating it at the time. Marshal Akhromeyev was there and also involved. We read it quite differently. The emphasis there was on a good faith effort to find mutually acceptable ways to deal with this question. There is no reference to a single binding ceiling. In fact, the word used was "ceilings", to look for ceilings and to seek verification.

It was always with the emphasis of good faith efforts, and we have made a good faith effort. What we find troubling is coming out of Moscow earlier this year. We thought we were down to several very specific up or down questions of a couple of words and a couple of numbers. So we were a bit surprised to see him say what he said.

Senator **Cohen**. My final point is on the issue of looking for areas of agreement. I asked before about the only precondition being that everything is on the table. Let me backtrack.

The Soviets have taken the initiative in making proposals dealing with arms control as it applies to our sea-based forces. What would you recommend if you were going to "negotiate" this? What would be some of your proposals?

You have indicated them here today. You would want to look at medium range bombers, heavy bombers perhaps, the Backfire bomber and some of the other capabilities the Soviets have.

Can you distinguish between a Soviet air force bomber or a Soviet naval bomber? Do they practice together? Does the Air Force in fact have targeting exercises against naval operations? What would you recommend that we put on the table specifically if we are going to sit down and negotiate?

We have heard the Soviet proposals about time, size, and areas of operation. What were some of the things that you would put on the table if we were to sit down?

Mr. HADLEY. Senator, I can take a crack at that. I do not, quite frankly, know how you do it, because even if you put limitations on some of these systems, if they continue to exist, they have the capability to pose a threat to your naval forces. The argument has been you need some nuclear capability in your Navy so as to deter the use of those forces against the Navy. I do not understand how you get out of that box so long as these forces still exist in terms of these land-based air.

Senator COHEN. In other words, you are saying as long as you have Backfire bombers in your inventory that we cannot rely upon any verification measure that would protect our sea-based systems?

Mr. HADLEY. I do not see how you do it, particularly if you have an objective of going to zero on the sea-based systems. I do not see how you solve this problem of dealing with the threat posed by the residual land-based air that the Soviets would have. Others may have different views, but I just do not see how you would do it.

Admiral TROST. A Backfire bomber is a threat, dependent on who aims it and who it is subordinated to. The long range Air Force subordinated Backfire bomber is every bit as much of a threat, has the same capability, the same mission as the Backfire bomber that is naval subordinated.

So, how to gain the confidence and how to come up with a structure that says this gives us assurance that what we are doing is in the best national security interests of the United States or reduces the threat to the Navy would be a very, very difficult issue. I do not know how to do it.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Cohen, I would recommend against it certainly at this time unless there is something out there I do not understand. Let me make a couple of points.

One is, what is the problem we are trying to solve? If the problem is the nuclear threat to our Navy, then I think that the CNO has accurately described it. If you want to get a handle on that, there is a lot out there you have to get a handle on. It is not just naval aircraft. It is not just all aircraft.

What about those SLBMs out there? We have a significant part of our nuclear deterrent on nuclear submarines carrying and operating at the seas. Are we then going to bring those into this regime? What are the implications for our nuclear deterrent?

One of the reasons we have had nuclear weapons over the years at sea is a part of recognizing that the nuclear umbrella that has kept the peace has always benefited from some diversification. We talk about the Triad, but there is more than that.

Let me make a more generic point of why I would recommend against this. It is not just that the plate is full. It is not just the additional resources and energy that we would have to divert to this task. It is not simply that we do not see where this is going;

but look what happens. You go into a negotiation. You build up expectations. People want you to come up with something, and pretty soon you will find that even if there are things that by themselves might be marginally in our interest to get, what is the price we pay for them? What is it that the Soviet Union would insist for something that we might find marginally useful?

So every time we look at this we come to the conclusion that now is not the time.

Senator COHEN. Let me go back to the first question I asked because it seems we have come full cycle now; that is, my understanding was that if everything were on the table you could foresee entering negotiations with the Soviet Union dealing with this particular issue. It seems to me that what you are saying now is, even assuming that if everything were on the table, it is still not in our interest to do so at this time or in our interest to do, period.

Is that correct? Which is correct?

Mr. HADLEY. I think that certainly reflects the view. I think it goes back to something Senator Kennedy said.

Senator COHEN. Reflects what?

Mr. HADLEY. I will answer. Something Senator Kennedy said. The test ought to be, can you come out with an outcome that is in our national security interest? I think what you are hearing here is we have not been able to come out with an arrangement that makes it work. You put all these things on the table.

We have not been able to come up with a combination of restraints that would seem to work, and that is what makes you reluctant to enter into the negotiations for the reasons Ambassador Lehman said. If you do not have an outcome that seems in your interest, it seems to us you are better off not getting into the negotiation.

Admiral TROST. I also am very cautious about the "what-if" and "if-not-now-when" type of approach. We have, for example, an Incidents at Sea Agreement between the two navies. It took 8 years of attempts by the United States to get the Soviets to agree to sit down and talk about that. Once we did, it took only 6 months to conclude the treaty, and it has served us very, very well.

I listened to Marshal Akhromeyev and others say we should be talking about START II, but we have not yet been able to satisfactorily conclude START, START I if we want to call it that. We still have not yet concluded a lot of the reductions that had to take place under the INF Treaty. I think we should, as a Nation, be looking at the progress, trying to make it, trying to make sure that we are in fact carrying out the intents on both sides of agreements that have taken place.

We should be working to include this myriad of agreements we have on the table today, dealing not just with nuclear weapons but with conventional forces and then, having achieved some of these things, okay, what is next? We keep going through all the what-if drills, and it is premature, in my view.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Cohen, I think there has been a revolution in arms control, and I think one of the most important things has been getting away from these grandiose and often propagandistic proposals of complete disarmament of all systems and get down to what the two sides can agree on that is in both of their interests.

We have raised a lot of the reasons why we think we would not want to deal with the tactical nuclear weapons. Many of those issues are involved in negotiations. I think I agree very strongly with the CNO. What I would recommend is that we continue to address the basic causes of the insecurity and somewhere down the road you see what you do next.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

First of all, I might just say times have changed since 1972. I mean, the Berlin Wall is down. No one is saying that the Russians have not modernized their SS–18 and deployed SS–24s and SS–25s. We all know that. That is all assumed. Nobody is suggesting that we are not a maritime power and not interested in meeting our responsibilities overseas. No one is suggesting that the SLBMs be a part of this kind of a negotiation. Akhromeyev did not say it.

We can hoist up red herrings and knock them down. We are not talking about limitations of aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean zones that have been suggested by the Russians. They are non-starters. That was stated clearly by most members of this committee in the hearing with Akhromeyev and in other discussions with them. They are absolute non-starters, and they certainly have to understand it.

We are just coming back to the question, though, in terms of the tactical weapons, whether there can be a regime that is established. There certainly is expectation.

I would certainly hope that we have negotiators who are able to come back and say there is just no way we can agree with it and be able to walk out of and have the American people understand it. I would certainly think that they are as able to walk out as they are able to walk in. I think that that has to be basic and fundamental. We certainly would not want to suggest that in these other treaties we have negotiated that there was such a degree of expectation that we had to do something that we might not otherwise have done.

I think all of us are realistic about the building of expectations, but certainly at this time if there are opportunities for increased kinds of security for the Navy, the question is whether it makes some sense.

I think an argument can be made that it is good arms control and that it promotes stability by removing one source of unintentional nuclear escalation and that it is good for maritime security because use of nuclear weapons at sea could erase our superiority of conventional force at sea, and the United States is phasing out most types of naval nuclear weapons anyway.

We have retired the Terrier anti-aircraft missiles as well as the ASROC and the SUBROC anti-submarine weapons. We have just this year canceled the Sea Lance program that could have replaced ASROC and SUBROC, so the question is whether there is room for enhancing what I would consider to be naval superiority.

Let me go to a couple other areas. Mr. Ambassador, is there anything you can tell us just about the negotiations on the cruise missiles? I know you are on your way back over to Moscow this weekend, so is there anything that is generally useful for us to know about whether you are going to be able to reach some kind of understanding? If not, we can get on to other areas. Obviously, we are interested. We do not want to have you make some statement that is not appropriate, so if you can say something about it, fine. But if you prefer not to, we understand that.

CRUISE MISSILES

Ambassador **Lehman**. Well, I will simply say that we thought we had come very, very close to an agreement in February in Moscow, and we see no reason why we should not be able to get an agreement along the lines that we had all discussed there, but we shall see.

Senator **Kennedy**. Admiral Trost, I want to ask about changes in the planned force levels for nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. The September 30, 1989 selected acquisition report reiterates the Navy's long-announced plan to procure a total of 4,104 SLCMs of all types, and of those 758 were to be nuclear versions and the rest one of three types of conventional SLCMs, but the December 31, 1989 report heralded a change. The total SLCM buy was reduced by 400 to 3,704. Within this reduced SLCM inventory, can you tell us how many will be nuclear versions?

Admiral **Trost**. Senator, I can provide you an insert for the record with those numbers. What you see over here I am quite certain reflects what has been authorized in the past. The future numbers remain classified and I will provide you the response.

[The information follows:]

The inventory objective for TLAM/N is [deleted]. Planned procurement will achieve a total of [deleted] TLAM/Ns, which is a shortfall of [deleted] missiles or about [deleted] of the objective.

Senator **Kennedy**. Ambassador Lehman, as you know, the Soviets suggested a limit of 400 deployed SLCMs as part of START. We defended our intention to deploy 758. There is a question about the new plans to deploy fewer nuclear SLCMs. Do the Soviet negotiators understand that?

SLCMS

Ambassador **Lehman**. Senator Kennedy, the Soviets have made a number of proposals over the years. Their basic argument on nuclear SLCMs has been that this is a route for circumvention of the START Treaty. We have not seen it that way.

As you know, while our long-range SLCM program is relatively large, the nuclear component of it is relatively small. What we have been trying to do is to say to the Soviet Union that we are prepared to provide them a way in which they can have reassurance that we are not circumventing.

Senator Cohen mentioned that some years ago I used to be on the staff of this committee. I remember one day I got a call from Gerry Strickler, the documents clerk. He said a bound volume of the hearings I wanted was in, and I think one of the Senators had wanted a copy as soon as possible, so I went out into the hall, I spoke to somebody for just a few minutes, went down to the documents room, and I was, I think, the third person to sign up for a copy of that document. Above me on the list was a representative of the Soviet Embassy.

It was a very detailed description of our military programs, what our buys were—the numbers, the dollars, the cost. It seems to me that they should not have this concern, because they will know well in advance what our plans are. But nevertheless, we have been prepared to make politically binding statements to them that would show them what our plans are in the years ahead. We think that should meet their concerns.

Senator KENNEDY. I was just wondering if the reduction assisted you in attempting to reach a compromise, because there is a significant reduction by 400, just in terms of purchase.

Admiral TROST. The reductions in the total buy of sea-launched cruise missiles reflect changes in the projected force levels in the Navy.

Senator KENNEDY. I am just wondering if that is helpful to Ambassador Lehman in trying to go ahead with the negotiations on this?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, it ought to help the Soviet Union be persuaded that what we have offered should help satisfy their concerns.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me ask you if they are dealing with the SLCMs outside of START? Hopefully, that will be achieved. Will that document be sent out for ratification in the Senate, do you know?

Ambassador LEHMAN. The final version, of course, has not been resolved.

Senator KENNEDY. Right.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Clearly, what the Soviet Union is seeking is a legally binding agreement. What we have been talking about is a politically binding agreement.

Senator KENNEDY. Is that going to be submitted to the Senate for ratification?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, since the document is not complete, I think it is premature.

Senator KENNEDY. But hopefully, if it is, just as a concept, if it is agreed to, if these work out the way that the President and you have stated, do you plan to submit that instrument to the Senate for ratification?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Let me look into that issue and get back to you. Clearly, we understand that when we bring up the START agreement that anything related to the START agreement will be subject to the whole discussion on consent to ratification. Whether or not the document itself is subject to specific provisions, such as section 33, I am not sure, and I do not think we can be sure until we have actually finished the agreement, but I think there are different implications between what the Soviets propose and what we propose.

Senator KENNEDY. I understand that. I think there would be a high degree of expectation and anticipation, should the document be completed, that it ought to be submitted to the Congress.

Admiral Trost, let me get back to you. I just have two remaining areas that I would like to talk with you about. Why should the numbers on SLCMs be classified if our proposal is to declare our inventory?

Admiral TROST. We classify all figures for intended purchases of arms—buys—until they become public information with the budget submission. Our future goals should be classified simply to protect our interests and make it a little tougher for the guy who does not like us so well to do his own planning.

Senator KENNEDY. But as I understand, the inventory will be declared——

Admiral TROST. The inventory would be declared, or the numbers beyond which we would not deploy would be declared, depending upon what the negotiations come up with.

Senator KENNEDY. As I understand it, the Soviets have between 115 and 130 nuclear and 115 and 120 diesel, anywhere from 230 to 250 in total. Does that sound about right?

Admiral TROST. That sounds about right.

Senator KENNEDY. We are at about 90?

Admiral TROST. At about 90, decreasing rapidly.

Senator KENNEDY. My question is on the possible benefits of reaching agreement on a common figure in terms of nuclear attack submarines. Would such a common limit be in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union? If there were fewer U.S. nuclear attack submarines, maybe that would reduce the threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines, enhancing deterrence. For the United States, fewer Soviet nuclear attack submarines would reduce the threat to our sea lines of communication, the means of supplying our overseas allies. Secure sea lines of communication would facilitate our ability to draw down forces in Europe as part of CFE.

Admiral Trost, do you agree that our nuclear submarines maintain an important technological edge over the Soviet counterparts?

Admiral TROST. I do feel they do, yes.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you believe we will be able to maintain this edge for the foreseeable future?

Admiral TROST. I do, as long as we are cautious in terms of what we give away in technology.

Senator KENNEDY. Would it be to our advantage, then, if we were able to reach some common numbers with the Soviet Union to have technological advantage and intend to keep that?

Admiral TROST. I will give you a yes and no answer, Senator Kennedy. If we were faced only with the threat of the Soviet Union, we should not be driven in our force level determinations by an agreement, but rather by what the particular requirement is going to be to deter that threat, or to fight it if we had to. The fact being that we do operate world-wide, and that in addition to the submarine forces of the Soviet Navy, we see 200 to 300 other diesel attack submarines predominantly in the hands of lots of countries, some of whom are not currently politically friendly to us, so I think we should be cautious by basing our force levels on requirement rather than on a particular agreement with a single country.

I would be delighted to see a smaller Soviet attack submarine force. Some of those submarines you mentioned are also nuclear-powered cruise missile launchers whose target is our aircraft carriers predominantly. I would be delighted to see those numbers come down, but I doubt that the Soviets would be interested in seeing them reduced unless we came to a level of attack submarine capability that is so low that they say well, we certainly have that one covered so we will agree to drop somewhat.

Senator **Kennedy**. We have some changes, certainly dramatic changes in terms of what has happened with the Warsaw Pact and Soviet troops and other changes in the Soviet Union, a changed world.

If there is some change to that particular aspect of the threat, obviously as you point out there are other countries that we have to be sensitive to in as far as their military capability is concerned.

Would it make sense to bring those numbers down which would permit us to meet our responsibilities in other parts of the world and to bring down the total number of nuclear attack submarines that the Soviets have?

Admiral **Trost**. I attempted, Senator Kennedy, in my posture statement which was presented to the full committee earlier this year, to lay out the rationale that underlies force level development, both the overall rationale for what we must do and have found ourselves historically tasked to do on a day-to-day basis around the world, and also the forces that we felt we needed to counter the existing Soviet threat.

I have been challenged because I said that the Soviet threat in terms of military capability remains, regardless of political statement. Nonetheless, the fact is that the capability still remains there, so for the time being I would be unwilling to reduce our own capability on the face of what is there.

I would note that as recently as last October, I was told by my Soviet Navy counterpart in Moscow that he was not interested in reductions, he was interested in continuing his modernization, and in view of that, and in view of what we observe in their force levels, I am not prepared to advocate reductions or agreements that reduce our capability further than the current budgetary trends are driving them.

Senator **Kennedy**. Well, we are going, as I understand it, down to 70 or 75 submarines from 90 by the end of the decade.

Admiral **Trost**. But not based on requirements.

Senator **Kennedy**. No, but we are going to do that. Why not try and get something for it? Maybe they can just say well, we know the Russians are going to do it anyway, so we are not going to respond, but if we are going to do that—and the Navy knew it was going to do it, and we have heard so much about dealing from strength—we certainly have the strength in this area, and we are going to take this unilateral action. Does it make any sense to try and get anything for that?

Admiral **Trost**. I do not think that is a good approach to take. It has been advocated in a lot of different areas. I do not think it is a good approach, simply because it says, we are going to agree because we see ourselves driven downward, to now agree that the requirement has gone away. I cannot do that, because I still have the legal responsibility to determine the proper requirement. I am not prepared to negotiate a lower level that is driven purely by budgetary considerations and disregards national security concerns.

Senator KENNEDY. No one is suggesting that, but you know the Warsaw Pact has gone. The three former Chiefs of Staff have all indicated that armed conflict was remote with the Soviet Union. We are just trying to find out whether we are going to recognize any of these changed world conditions and try to probe and find out ways in which we can see both preservation of Navy strength, but also recognize that there may be areas where we can see some movement.

Mr. Hadley, in your statement, on page 13 you state that the United States has supported various naval confidence-building measures that lower tensions, clarify misunderstandings and therefore reduce the risk of unintentional conflicts at sea. Those agreements include the 1972 Incidents at Sea, the 1986 Stockholm Agreement and 1989 Dangerous Military Activities, and they have built a solid foundation of naval confidence-building measures. Are there any others that you would see as constructive in this regard?

Mr. HADLEY. We are prepared, obviously, to look at those.

Senator KENNEDY. I am wondering whether you have any suggestions or recommendations of things that you believe would further enhance confidence-building?

Mr. HADLEY. I do not, at this point in time, have a specific proposal, Mr. Chairman. It was simply to make the point that this is an area where a lot of good work has been done with very much the Navy in the lead, in an area where it seemed in our interest, and in the interest of stability, to make progress. I do not have a specific proposal.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, the one I made to Marshal Akhromeyev is to publish their purchase of ships, their commissioning and decommissioning, their weapons systems, or the 5-year plan, which was published by the U.S. Navy. They might start right off with that, which would be, I think, generally something that would be useful, and I am sure there are a number of others, and we will try to explore them.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Admiral Trost, Marshal Akhromeyev said at our hearing that the United States had 20 aircraft carriers and the Soviet Union had zero. For the record, how many do we have?

Admiral TROST. We today have 14 deployable aircraft carriers, having just decommissioned *Coral Sea* to remain within that limit as *Abraham Lincoln* becomes ready to deploy this year.

Senator COHEN. How many under construction?

Admiral TROST. We have 2 under construction at the present time and another authorized.

Senator COHEN. And how many scheduled for retirement?

Admiral TROST. We are constrained currently to a level of 14 by Secretary of Defense guidance, and I cannot predict what the budget is going to constrain us to.

Senator COHEN. And my understanding is the Soviet Union now has two. They have two aircraft carriers under construction?

Admiral TROST. In terms of full-fledged aircraft carriers, they have two under construction and one which is undergoing post-shakedown availability having conducted sea trials last October. Those are full-fledged aircraft carriers comparable to our own smaller decks.

Senator COHEN. Smaller decks. Akhromeyev indicated they were 70,000 tons.

Admiral TROST. That is correct. That would put it in the category of *Midway* or *Coral Sea* in terms of size, our larger carriers being in the 90,000 plus range.

Senator COHEN. Are they also constructing ships that would have a short-range takeoff or a VSTOL takeoff capability?

Admiral TROST. They have four of those ships, the four Kiev class carriers in that category that carry VSTOL aircraft.

Senator COHEN. Would you agree on the attack submarine rate? I think Marshal Akhromeyev said they are producing roughly three or four a year.

Admiral TROST. They last year produced about five nuclear submarines and another four diesel submarines and appear to be proceeding at that rate.

Senator COHEN. What is the rate of U.S. production?

Admiral TROST. When we are lucky, we have two per year in terms of attack submarines and the one Trident submarine per year.

Senator COHEN. You were pretty strong in terms of emphasizing the superiority of the U.S. naval capability. Was your statement predicated upon the United States going forward with the SSN-21?

Admiral TROST. It is. I think it is an absolutely essential component of our future maritime capability.

Senator COHEN. And if you do not get the SSN-21, what does that do to your statement about the degree of superiority of the United States at sea?

Admiral TROST. We will be rapidly undermined as other nations continue their technological advances and we stand still because our 688 platform, which is now discontinued, lacked the growth room to make it quieter or give it better weapons capability.

Senator COHEN. If we were to have an agreement that restricted the number of nuclear attack submarines and there were no agreement on diesel submarines, the production of or deployment or sale of diesel capable, diesel powered submarines, what impact would that have upon our operations worldwide?

Admiral TROST. I would consider that to our disadvantage, especially since those diesel submarines operating in waters where they can either have air cover or do not have to worry about detection other than by very forward based forces of our own could operate successfully. We are watching very carefully the developments in what is known as air independent propulsion systems for diesel submarines which, if properly developed, both enhance their endurance and reduce their detectability.

Senator COHEN. I was somewhat confused about the question of the numbers of, let us say, Tomahawk missiles that we are going to procure. That is not a classified number.

Admiral TROST. The numbers that ought to be procured in the out years is classified and the total numbers are classified.

Senator COHEN. Well, I have a document here which says Tomahawk program overview March 9, 1989. It says unclassified, and it gives the entire profile.

Admiral TROST. Well, if that is correct, I admit defeat.

Senator COHEN. Do not give up so easily. I will try to find out why you have given us these numbers.

Admiral TROST. I will say that when we handle them internally, the documents are classified. I know that. [Laughter.]

Senator COHEN. I think it is the other way around. I think it is when you handle them internally, they are unclassified, but they get classified when they come over here.

Let me ask you one final question which I will address to the panel. Marshal Akhromeyev, speaking on his own, indicated that with respect to START and conventional forces in Europe the negotiations would come to a screeching halt unless the United States agrees to a reduction in naval forces and an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons at sea. Is that your understanding of the Soviet position at this point?

SOVIET PRECONDITION

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Cohen, not at all. We have never heard the Soviet Union say that naval arms control was a precondition for concluding the START negotiations that are underway right now. And, as you know, in the CFE mandate negotiations it was agreed that with respect to negotiations underway now, among the 23, naval forces would not be included.

What was agreed to is that in the confidence- and security-building measures negotiations in Vienna among the 35 nations, air and sea operations integral to land operations could be a subject for discussion.

Let me say that the Soviet Union—the closest the Soviet Union has come, I think, to some kind of linkage like that with naval arms control has really been about follow-on negotiations in the conventional area, but never in such strong language.

Senator COHEN. So you would see this as a definite backtracking on the part of the Soviet Union if he, in fact, is speaking on behalf of anyone but himself from the positions that have been formally advanced by the Soviet Union?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Well, let me say this is one case where I would be reassured if he said he was speaking only for himself.

Mr. HADLEY. Senator, I think we have to point out that President Bush and President Gorbachev both set as an objective having the broad outlines of a START agreement agreed at the upcoming summit here at the end of the month. They did not in their statement suggest that somehow that was contingent on progress on naval arms control. And also at the two plus four talks last week in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement he made a strong plea for speeding up and coming to closure on CFE and, again, made no similar reference. So, we would hope that that does not reflect the position of the Soviet Government.

Senator COHEN. What is your understanding with respect to the Soviet position on sea launched cruise missiles that is part of the START?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Cohen, it is not a precondition for us. They have said that they could not agree to conclude a START Treaty unless the sea launched cruise missile issue is concluded in some way. They appear to do it outside the START Treaty, but they want it dealt with.

The point I made earlier is that we did that in Moscow except for two very specific issues, and so we see no reason why there cannot be a mutually acceptable solution. But it is not our precondition.

Senator COHEN. One final point. In the past there has been, I would say, allied pressure to arrive at agreements, an INF Treaty, certainly pressure to structure an accord dealing with strategic limitations. What is the position of our allies with respect to naval arms control? Admiral Trost, Ambassador Lehman, has there been specific allied pressure to reach an accord on either tactical nuclear weapons, SLCMS, ALCMs? What is the position of our allies?

VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Cohen, we all, each in our various capacities, talk to the allies, but let me say there is no pressure from our allies on naval arms control. Their views on specific issues do vary somewhat. A number of our allies, not only in Europe, but especially in the Pacific, are very leery of naval arms control because they see it as deleterious to their security.

Indeed, in some of the regions including some of the really troubled regions such as the Middle East, one has to remember that many smaller nations believe that their security is greatly enhanced by an American naval presence in the region. Indeed, we believe that this kind of security enhancement by our naval presence helps, for example, with our nuclear non-proliferation efforts because nations will have less of an incentive when they think there are other ways their security can be guaranteed. They will have less of an incentive to develop chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, things of this nature.

So there are slight differences in views among our allies, but there are many allies who have very strong views opposed to the kind of naval arms control the Soviet Union is proposing.

Senator COHEN. Just let me conclude by repeating what I said in my opening remarks, that I do hope that Marshal Akhromeyev was speaking on his own behalf, and that it is not the position being floated by the Soviet Government as such, that START and CFE negotiations would come to a halt unless there were a precondition that we agree to enter into formal negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons or a broader category of naval arms control. I think it is a subject matter that is going to have to be addressed, that will be addressed, but it ought not to be tied as a precondition to concluding those two agreements, which I hope we can conclude when President Gorbachev comes to the United States. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me summarize what I understand you to be saying, that upon the satisfactory completion of the START agreement and the CFE agreement, that before further talks in either of these areas toward a START II or a CFE II, there will have to be a clear precondition that naval arms control must be a third forum initiated. Is that a correct statement? Is that the view held by Mr. Gorbachev or Marshal Akhromeyev?

I share Senator Cohen's view that it is inappropriate to tie those kinds of linkages, and I personally would be strongly opposed to that kind of linkage myself. But, at least, he is expressing his view at that time.

Admiral Trost, Vice Admiral Cooper, who is the U.S. Navy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Undersea Warfare stated—and this is taken from an unclassified prepared statement for a hearing that was held by our Strategic Force Subcommittee on Wednesday—"The strategic submarine force is controlled through a reliable, redundant, continuous, reconstitutable communications system. Comprehensive evaluations of each SSBN patrol by an independent agency have shown that SSBNs communications connectivity with the national command authority is greater than 99 percent."

If our communications capabilities are this good, why have we not required the installation of the permissive action links, the PALs on our SLBM and other nuclear weapons at sea as we have on other U.S. nuclear weapons?

Admiral TROST. We have, Senator Kennedy, for about the last 25 or 30 years, conducted various studies and means to enhance the safety of our nuclear weapons at sea as well as ashore. We have concluded that the capability to protect those weapons against unauthorized use is adequate without introducing additional mechanical or electronic devices which would further complicate the weapons system and, therefore potentially hamper its reliability in a combat situation.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is apparently a different judgment between the Army and the Navy or the Air Force and the Navy, is it not?

Admiral TROST. It may be because of the very fact that their principal purpose for permissive action links on the weapons they use is to protect those weapons that might be stored in overseas sites and, therefore, be subject to greater access in a bigger hurry than those that are buried inside missile submarines.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, there are certainly those that are stationed here in the United States that have them.

Admiral TROST. That is correct, because the design would be similar for both.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, if they feel that it is necessary or that it enhances the security of those systems both here and those that are deployed overseas and you have this kind of communication with the submarines, why not then use the similar mechanical protections?

Admiral TROST. I could only add that the answer is primarily, why do it if it is deemed not necessary? It has been so determined as a result of many studies—it is an additional complication, an additional cost to a system that does not require it.

Senator KENNEDY. The question comes back, in theory at least, that you would have a submarine that would be able to at least launch a nuclear weapon. That is the reason we wanted to ensure that that kind of situation does not happen in other nuclear areas.

It is difficult for me to understand if you have that type of communication. I understood previously 25 years ago that you did not have that kind of communication, and the case could be made. But with that kind of communication now, it is difficult for me to understand why the Navy would resist that additional kind of security.

Admiral TROST. I can only add that I would resist it because I am familiar with all the studies, and we have not found it necessary.

Senator KENNEDY. Okay. I want to thank you very much. It has been a very, very interesting and useful hearing. We are grateful to you, as I indicated earlier, for adjusting your programs and schedules. We thank you for your appearance here, and the committee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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